The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation by Mungan, Murat C.
Maryland Law Review
Volume 72 | Issue 1 Article 3
The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal
Tendencies and Incapacitation
Murat C. Mungan
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr
Part of the Criminal Law Commons, and the Law and Economics Commons
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Academic Journals at DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. It has been accepted for
inclusion in Maryland Law Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@UM Carey Law. For more information, please contact
smccarty@law.umaryland.edu.
Recommended Citation
Murat C. Mungan, The Law and Economics of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation, 72 Md. L. Rev. 156 (2012)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.law.umaryland.edu/mlr/vol72/iss1/3
  
 
156 
THE LAW AND ECONOMICS OF FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL 
TENDENCIES AND INCAPACITATION 
MURAT C. MUNGAN∗ 
ABSTRACT 
 Economic analyses of criminal law are frequently and heavily crit-
icized for being unable to explain many criminal law rules and doc-
trines people find intuitively just.  Existing economic models cannot 
properly explain, for instance, why criminal law distinguishes be-
tween (1) repeat offenders and first-time offenders, (2) murder and 
voluntary manslaughter, and (3) remorseful and non-remorseful of-
fenders. 
 This Article proposes a richer economic theory of crime that cap-
tures the rationales behind these practices and potentially behind 
many other important criminal law principles and doctrines.  Unlike 
an overwhelming majority of previous economic analyses, my theory 
accounts not only for the deterrent effect of criminal punishment, but 
also for its incapacitative effect.  Moreover, and perhaps more im-
portantly, it acknowledges the fact that people have fluctuating, ra-
ther than constant, criminal tendencies.  That is, it recognizes that 
some people who ordinarily would not consider committing a wrong-
ful act can, in rare circumstances, lapse into committing a crime.  
Surprisingly, these two simple but critical concepts have never to my 
knowledge been jointly considered in an economic analysis of crime, 
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even though their inclusion appears to be an obvious extension of the 
standard crime and deterrence model formalized almost half a centu-
ry ago by Gary Becker. 
 The threat of imprisonment deters crime, but even when deterrence 
fails and a crime is committed, imprisonment benefits society by pre-
venting the criminal from committing further wrongs outside prison 
for the duration of the sentence.  The more dangerous the criminal, 
the stronger the rationale for imprisonment because these incapacita-
tive benefits exist only if the offender would commit more crimes if left 
at large.  Since people have fluctuating criminal tendencies, howev-
er, the mere fact that a person committed a crime reveals imperfect in-
formation regarding his likelihood of recidivating.  As such, the of-
fender’s criminal history and the circumstances surrounding the 
crime reveal important pieces of information that can be used to up-
date our beliefs concerning the offender’s expected dangerousness—
that is, to distinguish those who have made an uncharacteristic mis-
take from the dangerous and reckless criminals. 
 Capturing the interaction between the incapacitation function of 
imprisonment and potential offenders’ fluctuating criminal tenden-
cies allows the model to supply specific, consequentialist justifica-
tions for repeat offender laws, voluntary manslaughter laws, and the 
treatment of remorse in criminal law.  Going forward, this more nu-
anced approach will provide a clearer lens through which to view 
other pervasive elements of criminal law, such as the mens rea re-
quirement, and to revisit the normative prescriptions of the previous 
generation of economic analyses. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Law and economics (“L&E”) has become one of the dominant 
approaches to analyzing legal subjects,1 including criminal law,2 but 
has also been one of the most controversial—especially in criminal 
law.3  Paralleling and sometimes intersecting the ongoing scholarly 
                                                        
 1.  See Francesco Parisi, Positive, Normative and Functional Schools in Law and Economics, 
18 EUR. J.L. & ECON. 259 (2004), who states: 
In many respects, the impact of law and economics has exceeded its planned 
ambitions.  One effect of the incorporation of economics into the study of law 
was to irreversibly transform traditional legal methodology.  Legal rules began to 
be studied as a working system—a clear change from the Langdellian tradition, 
which had relied almost exclusively on the self-contained framework of case 
analysis and classification, viewing law as little more than a filing system.  Eco-
nomics provided the analytical rigor necessary for the study of the vast body of 
legal rules present in a modern legal system.  This intellectual revolution came at 
an appropriate time, when legal academia was actively searching for a tool that 
permitted critical appraisal of the law, rather than merely strengthening the 
dogmatic consistencies of the system. 
Id. at 261; see also Joni Hersch & W. Kip Viscusi, Law and Economics as a Pillar of Legal Educa-
tion 1 (Vanderbilt Univ. Law Sch., L&E Working Paper No. 11-35, 2011), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1907760 (discussing “the role of 
economists in the faculty at major law schools, the influence of law and economics on legal 
scholarship, and the substantive areas of economics that intersect with legal issues”); Ben 
Depoorter & Jef Demot, The Cross-Atlantic Law and Economics Divide: A Dissent, 2011 U. ILL. 
L. REV. 1593, 1594–97 (2011) (discussing the success of L&E as a discipline and comparing 
its use in law schools in the United States versus Europe). 
 2.  The L&E approach has been applied to study crime and criminal law by lawyers as 
well as economists, and this line of research continues to attract the attention of numerous 
scholars.  See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, The Theory of Optimal Law Enforcement, 11 J. ECON. 
SURVEYS 267, 291–95 (1997) [hereinafter Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement] (citing refer-
ences); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of 
Law, 38 J. ECON. LITERATURE 45, 73–76 (2000) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Economic 
Theory of Law Enforcement] (same); A. Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Theory of Pub-
lic Enforcement of Law, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 450–54 (A. Mitchell Polin-
sky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law] 
(same); CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 432–36 (Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (same). 
 3.  See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, Behavioral Economic Analysis of Crime: A Critical Review, 15 
EUR. J.L. & ECON 5, 5 (2003) (“Within the law and economics controversy, the economic 
approach to crime has been one of the most challenged subjects.  The skepticism towards 
economic research on crime and criminal law has been widely expressed by criminologists 
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exchange over consequentialist and retributive theories of criminal 
punishment,4 there has long been heated debate over the useful-
ness5—and even legitimacy6—of economic analysis of criminal law. 
                                                        
and sociologists.”) (footnote omitted); Jules L. Coleman, Crimes and Transactions, 88 CAL. 
L. REV. 921, 926 (2000) (“I am denying simply that the economist of law can give anything 
resembling a plausible explanation of our criminal law.”); Paul H. Robinson & John M. 
Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter? A Behavioral Science Investigation, 24 OXFORD J. LEG. 
STUDIES 173 (2004) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?] (expressing 
skepticism over the deterrent effect of criminal law); Paul H. Robinson & John M. Darley, 
The Role of Deterrence in the Formulation of Criminal Law Rules: At Its Worst When Doing Its Best, 
91 GEO. L.J. 949, 950–53 (2003) [hereinafter Robinson & Darley, Role of Deterrence] (ques-
tioning the deterrent effect of specific rules in criminal justice systems, potential offend-
ers’ knowledge of legal rules, and potential offenders’ ability to use their knowledge of le-
gal rules to guide their decisions).  For an additional view, see William L. Barnes, Jr., 
Revenge on Utilitarianism: Renouncing a Comprehensive Economic Theory of Crime and Punish-
ment, 74 IND. L.J. 627 (1999), who debates the appropriateness of assumptions used in L&E 
analyses of criminal law: 
I will then examine some additional assumptions made by law and economics 
scholars: that behavior can be best explained by assuming that people weigh the 
costs and benefits of any action and choose the action that provides the greatest 
utility (the “rational actor” assumption); and that an economic analysis provides 
a complete explanation of any field of law (the “universality” assumption).  I will 
show that these assumptions are particularly ill-suited to an analysis of criminal 
law, and that they, like the deterrence assumption, detract from the usefulness of 
the economic theory. 
Id. at 628. 
 4.  Retributivists frequently point out that consequentialism does not provide a prin-
cipled account for why innocent people should not be punished. See, e.g., Russell L. Cris-
topher, Deterring Retributivism: The Injustice of “Just” Punishment, 96 NW. U. L. REV. 843, 848–
49 (2002) (summarizing retributivist criticisms directed at consequentialist theories of 
punishment, and “seek[ing] to turn back retributivism’s principal criticisms of the conse-
quentialist theory onto itself”).  The failure by consequentialism to justify adherence to 
this pervasive criminal law principle was used by retributivists to question the normative 
appeal of utilitarian theories.  See, e.g., Dan Markel, Retributive Justice and the Demands of 
Democratic Citizenship, 1 VA. J. CRIM. L. 1, 43 n.111 (2012) (criticizing utilitarian welfarism).  
As briefly discussed in this Article, a similar method was used by L&E critics to question the 
normative appeal of economic analyses of criminal law. 
 5.  See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 627–28 (discussing “the limits of the economic 
model as a useful tool for enhancing our understanding of the criminal law”); Claire 
Finkelstein, The Inefficiency of Mens Rea, 88 CAL. L. REV. 895, 896 (2000) (noting that there 
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Pioneers of L&E, including Richard Posner, Mitchell Polinsky, 
and Steven Shavell, rigorously applied the L&E methodology to assess 
the desirability of various criminal laws and procedures.7  On the oth-
er hand, prominent legal scholars such as Jules Coleman and Claire 
Finkelstein have expressed enormous skepticism toward the L&E ap-
proach.8  Scholars in the latter camp focused on the inability of the 
L&E approach to provide explanations for a number of criminal law 
doctrines with popular and intuitive appeal9 and concluded on that 
basis that L&E is ill-suited for analyzing criminal law.10 
No single article is likely to resolve the larger philosophical dif-
ferences separating the two camps, but in this Article I will attempt to 
demonstrate that this core criticism, at least, is unwarranted.  To do 
so, I develop a richer L&E theory11 that is capable of explaining the 
                                                        
are “fundamental features of economic analysis that make it ill-suited to explain the exist-
ence of the criminal law’s mens rea requirement”). 
 6.  See, e.g., Coleman, supra note 3, at 927–30 (arguing that “the economic analyst’s 
conceptualization of [criminal law] is fundamentally flawed”); Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 
896 (criticizing economic analysis of criminal law). 
 7.  See PIONEERS OF LAW AND ECONOMICS (Lloyd R. Cohen & Joshua D. Wright eds., 
2011) (reviewing the academic contributions of pioneers of L&E, including Posner, Polin-
sky and Shavell). 
 8.  See supra notes 3 and 5. 
 9.  See, e.g., Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 896 (arguing that economics is incapable of 
explaining “the existence of the criminal law’s mens rea requirement”); see also Dan M. 
Kahan & Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Conceptions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 COLUM. L. 
REV. 269, 304–05 (1996) (discussing the limits of the “narrow consequentialist[]” ap-
proach, used frequently in normative economic analyses, in providing an explanation for 
the treatment of voluntary manslaughter in criminal law). 
 10.  See, for example, Finkelstein, supra note 5, who states: 
If I am correct, both about the core of mens rea and about the inability of eco-
nomic analysis to explain it, the prospect of an economic analysis of the notion 
of crime seems dim.  For if a knowledge requirement cannot be explained in 
economic terms, and if knowledge is as pervasive a requirement as I believe it to 
be, then economic analysis would be unable to explain the basic structure of 
criminal wrongs. 
Id. at 898; see also, e.g., Barnes, supra note 3, at 627 (“Since Gary Becker’s seminal article, 
various scholars have either endeavored to resolve the economic model’s inherent incon-
sistencies or have rejected the model entirely” (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted)). 
 11.  Developing a richer L&E theory necessitates the elimination of simplifying as-
sumptions in prior L&E analyses.  It should be noted, however, that using simplifying as-
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social benefits of numerous pervasive criminal law rules and doc-
trines.  Specifically, I construct an economic model of criminal law 
that incorporates two simple facts: (1) one’s tendency to commit a 
crime or crimes fluctuates over time,12 and (2) imprisonment reduces 
crime through its incapacitation effect.13  I illustrate that the interac-
tion between these two simple facts is so crucial that L&E models that 
ignore one or both are incapable of capturing the usefulness of im-
portant phenomena in criminal law.  As such, it is the exclusion of 
these factors, and not any inherent unsuitability of the approach, that 
is responsible for some of the criticized failures of economic analyses 
of criminal law. 
Surprisingly, these two facts have never to my knowledge been 
jointly accounted for in existing normative L&E analyses of criminal 
law14 since its inception by Gary Becker in 1968.15  In fact, an over-
                                                        
sumptions may provide many advantages, including allowing tractability by isolating vari-
ous issues.  In fact, the success of the L&E approach is due, at least in part, to its ability to 
formulate discrete hypotheses by making harmless and simplified assumptions. 
 12.  Professor Robert Cooter, to the best of my knowledge, was the first to formalize a 
similar point in the L&E literature.  See Robert D. Cooter, Lapses, Conflict, and Akrasia in 
Torts and Crimes: Towards an Economic Theory of the Will, 11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 149, 149–
51 (1991) (constructing an L&E model where people occasionally lapse and commit 
crime); see also Eric A. Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977, 1977–79 (2001) 
(building a framework which assumes that people have “calm” preferences and “emotion 
state” preferences, which implies that they have varying degrees of control over their ac-
tions at different points in time).  See infra Part IV for a discussion of fluctuating criminal 
tendencies in further detail. 
 13.  See Steven D. Levitt, Why Do Increased Arrest Rates Appear to Reduce Crime: Deterrence, 
Incapacitation, or Measurement Error?, 36 ECON. INQUIRY 353, 353–55 (1998) (analyzing de-
terrence and incapacitation effects of imprisonment); Daniel Kessler & Steven D. Levitt, 
Using Sentence Enhancements to Distinguish Between Deterrence and Incapacitation, 42 J.L. & 
ECON. 343, 343–46 (1999) (same); see also Steven D. Levitt & Thomas J. Miles, Empirical 
Study of Criminal Punishment, in 1 HANDBOOK OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 455, 471–74 (A. 
Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell eds., 2007) (summarizing empirical studies distinguish-
ing the deterrence and incapacitation effects of imprisonment in reducing crime). 
 14.  See infra Part III for a review of trends in L&E analyses of criminal behavior. 
 15.  Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 
(1968); see also Nuno Garoupa, The Economics of Organized Crime and Optimal Law Enforce-
ment, 38 ECON. INQUIRY 278, 278 (2000) [hereinafter Garoupa, Organized Crime] (“The 
economic analysis of crime has its starting point with Becker’s [1968] seminal work”) (al-
teration in original).  It should be noted, however, that as early as the eighteenth century, 
Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Bentham, without using tools from modern microeconomics, 
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whelming majority of previous analyses assume that criminals have 
constant tendencies to commit crime16 and that the only benefit of 
imprisonment is deterrence.17  But an analysis that does not 
acknowledge fluctuating criminal tendencies overlooks the fact that 
even calm and peaceful people may, even if rarely, lapse into commit-
ting crimes.18  Moreover, a framework that ignores the incapacitation 
                                                        
provided insights that resemble the ideas presented by Becker and other L&E scholars.  
CESARE BECCARIA, ON CRIMES AND PUNISHMENTS (Henry Paolucci trans., Bobbs Merril 
Educ. Publ’g 1978) (1764); JEREMY BENTHAM, AN INTRODUCTION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF 
MORALS AND LEGISLATION (Clarendon Press, rev. ed. 1823) (1789); BARON DE 
MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS (D. Appleton & Co. ed., 1900) (1748).  Some of 
Bentham’s ideas have striking similarities to those presented by Becker, although Becker 
appears to have had no knowledge of Bentham’s ideas when he started thinking about the 
economic analysis of crime.  See Richard A. Posner, Bentham’s Influence on the Law and Eco-
nomics Movement, in 51 CURRENT LEGAL PROBLEMS 425, 431–32 (1998) (noting the similari-
ties between the two but noting, “I have it on good authority—namely from Becker him-
self—that when he began thinking about the economics of crime, he was unaware of 
Bentham’s discussion of it”); see also Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, 
supra note 2, at 45 (discussing the contributions of Montesquieu, Beccaria, and Bentham 
to the economics of criminal law enforcement). 
 16.  See, e.g., Posner, supra note 12, at 1984 (“Economists usually assume that prefer-
ences remain stable over the period of time relevant to analysis.”); see also Garoupa, Opti-
mal Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 287 (surveying economic models of law enforcement 
and criminal law where constant criminal tendencies are typically assumed); Polinsky & 
Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 47–51 (same); Polinsky & 
Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2 (same).  Part III discusses constant criminal 
tendencies in further detail. 
 17.  There are a few normative L&E articles focusing on the incapacitation effect of 
punishment without considering fluctuating criminal tendencies.  See, e.g., Steven Shavell, 
A Model of Optimal Incapacitation, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 107 (1987) [hereinafter Shavell, Opti-
mal Incapacitation]; Thomas J. Miceli, A Model of Criminal Sanctions That Incorporate Both De-
terrence and Incapacitation, 107 ECON. LETTERS 205 (2010) [hereinafter Miceli, Deterrence and 
Incapacitation]; Thomas J. Miceli, Deterred or Detained? A Unified Model of Criminal Punishment 
(Univ. Conn. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper 2009-16, 2009), available at http://www.econ. 
uconn.edu/working/2009-16.pdf [hereinafter Miceli, Deterred or Detained?]; Thomas J. 
Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation Models of Criminal Punishment: Can the Twain Meet? 
(Univ. Conn. Dep’t Econ., Working Paper 2009-25, 2009) [hereinafter Miceli, Can the 
Twain Meet?], available at http://www.econ.uconn.edu/working/2009-25.pdf).  Alternative-
ly, some articles consider variants of fluctuating criminal tendencies without considering 
incapatitation.  See, e.g., Cooter, supra note 12, at 149–51. 
 18.  See supra note 12. 
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function of imprisonment fails to recognize that, under the standard 
consequentialist account, we punish not just to deter future miscon-
duct, but also to segregate a dangerous person from society, so that he 
can no longer act as a threat.19  Therefore, it is only natural for previ-
ous economic analyses of crime to fail to capture the information ex-
ploiting features of various criminal law practices. 
A rule or mechanism is capable of exploiting information if it 
can, on average, distinguish between individuals based on their likeli-
hoods of recidivating and punish them accordingly.20  Practices such 
as (1) punishing repeat offenders more severely,21 (2) punishing re-
morseful offenders less severely,22 and (3) punishing voluntary man-
                                                        
 19.  See Shavell, supra note 17, at 107–09 (constructing an economic model of incapaci-
tation where social benefits from imprisonment increase with the dangerousness of the 
offender). This argument has a caveat that was pointed out by Isaac Ehrlich: Criminals can 
continue to commit wrongful acts in prison. Isaac Ehrlich, On the Usefulness of Controlling 
Individuals: An Economic Analysis of Rehabilitation, Incapacitation, and Deterrence, 71 AM. ECON. 
REV. 307, 315 (1981). 
 20.  There is a related literature on selective incapacitation, which focuses on the pos-
sibility of “discriminat[ing] among offenders on the basis of predicted risk by using” prox-
ies for offenders’ dangerousness that differ from those being used in the criminal justice 
system.  PETER W. GREENWOOD, SELECTIVE INCAPACITATION xx (1982).  My objective is not 
to suggest the use of such proxies, but to focus on existing practices in criminal law, and to 
show that L&E can explain their social desirability.  It should also be noted that infor-
mation-exploiting features of repeat offender laws have attracted the interest of none-
conomists.  Although I am unaware of normative L&E analyses of optimal law enforcement 
that focus on the information-exploiting features of these laws, there are articles that pro-
vide simple simulations, some of which make the descriptive point that short prison terms 
can be sufficient to incapacitate dangerous offenders.  Cf., e.g., Linda S. Beres & Thomas 
D. Griffith, Do Three Strike Laws Make Sense? Habitual Offender Statutes and Criminal Incapaci-
tation, 87 GEO. L.J. 103, 138 (1998) (concluding that longer prison terms can only achieve 
a modest reduction in crime). 
 21.  See, e.g., U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5A (2011) (displaying sentencing 
table, which imposes harsher penalties for repeat offenders); see also A. Mitchell Polinsky & 
Steven Shavell, On Offense History and the Theory of Deterrence, 18 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 305, 
305 (1998) [hereinafter Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History] (“In practice, the law often 
sanctions repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders.”).  The authors also 
provide a number of examples of laws requiring harsher penalties for repeat offenders.  Id. 
at 305–06. 
 22.  See infra Part III.B.2. 
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slaughter less severely than murder23 can be viewed as information 
exploiting mechanisms.  Previous L&E models cannot provide satisfy-
ing rationales for these practices because they overlook their infor-
mation-exploiting features.24 
                                                        
 23.  See, e.g., MODEL PENAL CODE § 210.3(2). (designating voluntary manslaughter as a 
“felony of the second degree”); see also Posner, supra note 12, at 1995 n.34 (briefly discuss-
ing conditions under which heat of passion killings were excused in Roman law); Kahan & 
Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305–23 (discussing the conditions under which murder is re-
duced to voluntary manslaughter in common law and existing scholarship attempting to 
provide rationales for such reduction). 
 24.  Existing L&E analyses of repeat offender laws provide mixed and qualified results, 
ranging from less severe to equal or more severe punishments for repeat offenders.  See, 
e.g., Murat C. Mungan, Repeat Offenders: If They Learn, We Punish Them More Severely, 30 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 173 (2010) [hereinafter Mungan, Repeat Offenders] (deriving optimal sanc-
tion schemes for repeat offenders when they can learn how to escape detection through 
their past experiences with the criminal justice system, and suggesting that repeat offend-
ers ought to be punished more severely than first time offenders only if such learning ef-
fects are significant); Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 438 
(demonstrating that uniform sanctions are optimal when adequate deterrence can be 
achieved, and observing that “only if deterrence is inadequate is it possibly desirable to 
condition sanctions on offense history”); Winand Emons, A Note on the Optimal Punishment 
for Repeat Offenders, 23 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 253 (2003) (concluding that “[t]he optimal 
sanction scheme is decreasing rather than increasing in the number of offenses” when 
“agents . . . follow history-dependent strategies” and a few other conditions are met); Po-
linsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 305–07 (deriving optimal sanction 
schemes for repeat offenders and concluding that it is optimal to punish repeat offenders 
and young first-time offenders with the same sanction, and to punish old first-time offend-
ers less severely than the former two).  Part III.B.1 provides a more detailed discussion of 
the discrepancies between implications of economic analyses of criminal law and existing 
laws concerning the punishment of repeat offenders.  Similarly, consequentialist analyses 
generally suggest that remorse ought to be irrelevant in the determination of sanctions.  
See, e.g., Bryan H. Ward, Sentencing Without Remorse, 38 LOYOLA U. CHI. L.J. 131, 132 (2006) 
(arguing that “remorse should not be relevant in criminal sentencing”); Murat C. Mungan, 
Don’t Say You’re Sorry Unless You Mean It: Pricing Apologies to Achieve Credibility, 32 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 178, 178, 181 n.20 (2012) [hereinafter Mungan, Apologies] (arguing that re-
morse is ordinarily mere “cheap talk” and that taking remorse seriously “makes little sense” 
from a utilitarian point of view if one “abstracts from issues related to the incapacitation 
function of imprisonment”).  To the best of my knowledge, there is no economic model of 
law enforcement suggesting that voluntary manslaughter ought to be punished less severe-
ly than murder. 
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To address this shortcoming, I argue for modifying the standard 
economic model of crime and deterrence in two ways: (1) replacing 
the assumption of constant criminal tendencies with the assumption 
of fluctuating criminal tendencies, and (2) accounting for the fact that 
imprisonment lowers crime by segregating criminals from the rest of 
the society.  To explain the first proposed modification, consider the 
standard L&E model of crime in which people have constant criminal 
tendencies.  The standard model unrealistically assumes that a per-
son’s illicit benefit from committing a given act is constant over time 
and that he has perfect self-control.25  As such, the model assumes that 
people consistently make the same choices over illegal and legal op-
tions.  They do not, for instance, park legally today and park illegally 
tomorrow, unless the expected fine for illegal parking changes over 
time.  Fortunately, existing tools in economics can be used to replace 
this false assumption with a more realistic one: fluctuating criminal 
tendencies.  This new assumption embodies the common belief that, 
as one court observed in 1859, crimes may occur “from the infirmity 
of passion to which even good men are subject.”26 
The explanation of the second proposed modification requires a 
brief description of trends in economic analyses of criminal law.  An 
overwhelming majority of economic analyses of criminal law focus on 
deterrence and ignore other potential justifications for punishment, 
including incapacitation.  Needless to say, the incapacitation function 
of punishment contributes to reductions in crime rates.27  Such inca-
pacitation benefits, however, are largely ignored in normative eco-
nomic analyses of criminal law because their inclusion has not been 
seen to dramatically alter the implications of standard crime and de-
terrence models.28  But, as I demonstrate, a richer economic model 
incorporating fluctuating criminal tendencies provides simple and 
powerful rationales for existing practices, which the standard model 
cannot explain.  A repeat offender’s criminal record reveals that it is 
unlikely that he is a person who, under unusual circumstances, failed 
to exert control over temptations to commit a crime.  Instead, it is 
much more probable that he is a person who has a high tendency to 
                                                        
 25.  See supra note 16. 
 26.  State v. Cook, 1859 WL 4467, at *144 (Ohio Com. Pl. 1859), rev’d, 1859 WL 4465 
(Ohio Dist. 1859) (emphasis added). 
 27.  See supra note 13. 
 28.  See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 17; Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation, supra note 17; 
Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17; see infra Part III for a discussion of this point in 
further detail. 
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commit crime.  Therefore, if not imprisoned, he is more likely than a 
first-time offender to commit subsequent crimes.  As such, due to the 
high benefits from incapacitation, penalty enhancements for repeat 
offenders are justified.  Similarly, a truly remorseful offender is less 
likely to commit his previous wrongs under similar conditions in the 
future.  Therefore, he is unlikely to recidivate and incapacitation 
benefits from imprisonment are minimal.  Accordingly, it is desirable 
to punish truly remorseful offenders less severely.29  Finally, a person 
who commits a crime in the heat of passion is likely to have commit-
ted the crime due to extreme emotional stimuli.  If so, the mere fact 
that he committed the crime reveals relatively little information about 
his dangerousness absent those stimuli.  Expected incapacitation ben-
efits from punishing him are small compared to similar benefits from 
punishing a criminal who committed an illegal act without provoca-
tion.  As such, reduced penalties for voluntary manslaughter are justi-
fied. 
All explanations provided above rely on similar rationales.30  
Once fluctuating criminal tendencies are incorporated, the mere fact 
that a person committed a crime reveals imperfect information about 
his dangerousness.  The circumstances surrounding the crime reveal 
important pieces of information that can be used to update our be-
liefs concerning offenders’ dangerousness.  Since expected incapaci-
tative benefits are greater for more dangerous offenders, the more 
strongly we believe—based on the circumstances surrounding the 
crime—that the criminal is dangerous, the stronger an L&E approach 
suggests that he should be imprisoned.  We should be more skeptical, 
                                                        
 29.  One may naturally question whether courts can distinguish truly remorseful of-
fenders from offenders who “fake remorse.”  It is plausible to assume that perfectly sepa-
rating remorseful and non-remorseful offenders is impossible.  This is the primary reason 
why the deterrence-based economic analysis, in which there is no direct social benefit to 
punishing truly remorseful offenders less severely, suggests that sentence reductions for 
successfully asserting remorse are generally suboptimal.  See, e.g., Mungan, Apologies, supra 
note 24, at 178 (arguing against reducing sentencing for assertions of remorse).  If, how-
ever, as argued in Section V there are benefits to punishing truly remorseful offenders less 
severely, a trade-off emerges between obtaining such benefits and costs due to non-
separability problems.  This suggests that sentence reductions for those who convincingly 
display remorse are justified in a broader range of conditions.  Part V.B discusses remorse 
and apologies in further detail. 
 30.  These rationales rely on what can formally be called Bayesian updating, which is 
described more formally and in further detail in note 193. 
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in turn, of harsh sentences for individuals who demonstrate a low 
propensity for crime. 
Beyond offering an efficiency rationale for these existing practic-
es, correcting the standard model has significant descriptive and 
normative implications for the economic theory of criminal law.  Alt-
hough future work will focus on determining the extent to which ac-
counting for the information-exploiting features of criminal law leads 
to results different from those obtained under the standard model, I 
will make two preliminary observations here. 
First, existing economic models of crime and deterrence fre-
quently have been used to advocate for the necessity of harsh criminal 
justice policies.31  As briefly discussed above and explained in further 
detail in the proceeding Parts, a richer economic model of crime, as 
presented in this Article, suggests that first-time offenders ought to be 
treated leniently, and that remorseful individuals and criminals acting 
in the heat of passion ought to be punished less severely.  As such, this 
Article suggests that harsh penalties should be reserved for individuals 
who have, through their actions, demonstrated that they are likely to 
recidivate. 
Second, it has been previously suggested that “fundamental fea-
tures of economic analysis . . . make it ill-suited to explain the exist-
ence of the criminal law’s mens rea requirement.”32  I believe the 
economic theory of criminal law I propose in this Article is capable of 
proving this claim wrong.  The mens rea requirement in criminal law 
can be conceptualized as an information-exploiting device: a crimi-
nal’s mental state while committing a harmful act provides infor-
mation about his likelihood of recidivating.  As such, the rationales 
identified in this Article suggest that criminals should be punished, 
ceteris paribus, in proportion to the intentionality of their acts.  Devel-
oping a complete model to conceptualize mens rea as an information-
exploiting device is, however, an immense task that I cannot under-
take in this Article. 
This Article proceeds as follows.  Part I provides a summary of 
the relevant criticisms directed at economic analyses of crime and 
punishment.  Part II briefly explains how economic analyses of crime 
                                                        
 31.  See John J. Donohue III, Economic Models of Crime and Punishment, 74 SOC. RES. 379, 
380 (2007) (explaining how Gary Becker’s 1968 article “started to powerfully influence 
criminal justice policy in the 1970s and provided the intellectual support for . . . the in-
creasing harshness of the American criminal justice system over the last 30 years.” (citing 
Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968))). 
 32.  Finkelstein, supra note 5, at 896. 
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and punishment have focused on deterrence and have largely ignored 
other potential consequentialist justifications for punishment, such as 
rehabilitation and incapacitation.  In Part III, I explain how economic 
models assume constant criminal benefits.  Section IV clarifies how 
fluctuating criminal tendencies can be incorporated in economic 
analyses of crime.  Finally, in Part V, I describe how a rich model in-
corporating fluctuating criminal benefits and incapacitation benefits 
of imprisonment provides rationales for existing criminal law doc-
trines and practices. Part VI concludes. 
I.  CRITICISMS DIRECTED AT ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
Despite providing useful analytical tools to evaluate the desirabil-
ity of numerous rules and standards,33 L&E is frequently criticized on 
various grounds.  In particular, economic analyses of criminal law are 
criticized for making use of unrealistic assumptions and having lim-
ited explanatory power.34  Before specifying these criticisms, it will be 
useful to summarize the simple Beckerian framework,35 which many 
L&E scholars use to analyze issues related to criminal law and proce-
dure.36 
A.  Crime and Deterrence Model: The Beckerian Framework 
In 1968, Gary Becker provided a framework to analyze criminal 
decision-making by using modern economics.37  After his great con-
tribution, many scholars started analyzing various issues in criminal 
law by adopting his framework.38  In the simplest form of the Beckeri-
                                                        
 33.  See supra note 1. 
 34.  See supra notes 3, 5 and 9. 
 35.  A variant of this framework was presented by Bentham in 1789. But Becker pro-
vided the first formal model by using modern economic tools.  See supra note 15. 
 36.  See  Garoupa, Organized Crime, supra note 15 (applying a Beckerian framework); 
Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 267–69 (same); Polinsky & Shavell, Eco-
nomic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 46–48 (same); see also Polinsky & Shavell, 
Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 405 (surveying economic models of law enforce-
ment developed subsequent to Becker’s article). 
 37.  Becker, supra note 15; see also Garoupa, Organized Crime, supra note 15; Donohue, 
supra note 31, at 381–85. 
 38.  See Garoupa, Optimal Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 267–69 (utilizing a Beckeri-
an analysis); Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforcement, supra note 2, at 46–48 
(utilizing a Beckerian analysis); Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2 
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an model, a fraction of society consists of potential offenders, and a 
potential offender is a person who benefits from the commission of a 
crime and dislikes being punished.39  Offenders are assumed to know 
the probability (p) with which they will be caught if they commit a 
crime and the sanction (s) that they will be subject to if caught. 
In this framework, a potential offender is assumed to commit a 
crime only if the benefit from the crime (b) exceeds the expected 
sanction (p x s).40  Because it is assumed that potential offenders differ 
from each other in their criminal benefits, it follows that only offend-
ers with b > (p x s) commit crime.41  This model is then used to evalu-
ate various law enforcement mechanisms and to derive optimal poli-
cies.42 
It should be noted that Beckerian models do not rule out the 
possibility that potential offenders, when making decisions, may take 
into account moral or sociological considerations.  The variable b is 
interpreted as incorporating all considerations related to the commis-
                                                        
(surveying economic models of law enforcement developed subsequent to Becker’s arti-
cle). 
 39.  One may question whether under this definition everyone in society is a potential 
offender.  This does not follow, because, as explained in the proceeding portion of this 
Part, benefits include non-monetary considerations; therefore, not all individuals benefit 
from the commission of a crime.  I elaborate further on this and related points in Part III 
and IV. 
 40.  This is true in the simplest form of Beckerian models.  In more sophisticated 
models that incorporate criminals’ risk preferences, criminals are assumed to make deci-
sions by comparing expected utilities rather than expected values.  See, for example, Donohue, 
supra note 31, at 328–83, for an informative discussion on criminals’ risk preferences and 
how risk preferences may appear in Beckerian models.  See also Jeffrey Grogger, Certainty 
vs. Severity of Punishment, 29 ECON. INQUIRY 297, 297–98 (1991) (reconciling conflicting 
findings from prior research on the effect of the certainty of punishment and the severity 
of punishment on crime rates); Michael K. Block & Vernon E. Gerety, Some Experimental 
Evidence on Differences Between Student and Prisoner Reactions to Monetary Penalties and Risk, 24 
J. LEGAL STUD. 123, 123–24 (1995) (employing an empirical model to study criminals’ risk 
preferences).  For purposes of demonstrating what constant benefits mean, it is sufficient 
to focus on simpler models. 
 41.  An earlier version of this statement dates back to 1789.  See Posner, supra note 15, 
at 431 (“Bentham had made a number of important economic points in the Introduction: a 
person commits a crime only if the pleasure he anticipates from the crime exceeds the an-
ticipated pain . . . .”). 
 42.  See, e.g., Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 450–54 (list-
ing a number of articles using this approach). 
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sion of a crime; a potential offender’s benefit is not limited to mone-
tary or pecuniary gains. 
Implicit in the Beckerian framework is the idea that people, even 
criminals, respond to incentives.  A potential criminal compares the 
benefits to expected losses, and decides whether or not to commit a 
crime.  Although this idea sounds intuitive—and is trivially true to 
many economists43—it is the basis for many criticisms aimed at eco-
nomic analyses of crime. 
B.  The Deterrability Assumption 
Simple Beckerian models imagine a world where every individual 
can be deterred from committing crime.  This deterrence can poten-
tially be achieved through the threat of punishment.  Using the previ-
ously introduced notation, I deduce that for any individual who has a 
benefit of b from crime there generally is an expected sanction (p x s) 
exceeding his benefit, and therefore capable of deterring him.44 
This feature of simple Beckerian models is the focal point of 
many criticisms.45  Many scholars make the observation that it may be 
impossible to deter a particular individual from committing crime 
under many circumstances.  A person who is intoxicated or finds his 
wife in bed with a stranger may not consider the expected punish-
ment associated with committing a crime, even if fully aware of the se-
verity and certainty of punishment.46 
                                                        
 43.  Many economists interpret this as a simple application of the “revealed prefer-
ence” concept.  See Hal R. Varian, Revealed Preference, in SAMUELSONIAN ECONOMICS AND 
THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY 99–115 (Michael Szenberg, Lall Ramrattan & Aron A. 
Gottesman eds., 2006) (providing a survey of revealed preference analysis and explaining 
the concept in detail). 
 44.  In the rare case where a potential offender does not value his life much, it may be 
impossible to deter him through punishment. Ignoring the possibility of torture, let s be 
the upper bound for punishment (for example, the death penalty).  In this case, it is im-
possible to deter an individual for whom b>ps.  But, even in those rare cases, deterrence 
can theoretically, although impracticably, be achieved by offering the potential offender 
something of greater value than what he has to gain through crime, on the condition that 
he abstains from committing crime. 
 45.  See supra notes 3, 5, 9, and 10 and accompanying text. 
 46.  See Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 3, at 178–82 (discussing 
the “Rational Choice Hurdle” and arguing that “[b]ehavioural scientists who study the de-
cision-making patterns of people now realize that being able to demonstrate that a person 
has some knowledge of various facts that could be relevant to a decision does not mean 
  
172 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:156 
The idea that people often do not consider costs when making 
decisions, or heavily discount them, is also supported by recent re-
search in behavioral L&E.  This line of research points out that many 
people suffer from what is called bounded willpower, and that they face 
difficulties in delaying gratification, even when they know that doing 
so will serve their long-term self-interest.47  As such, insights from be-
havioral L&E support the claim that the basic assumption that people 
are deterrable is not globally applicable. 
C.  Common Knowledge Assumption 
Another assumption that is commonly invoked in simple Beck-
erian models is that potential criminals have perfect knowledge about 
the expected punishment associated with various crimes.48  Using the 
previous notation,49 a potential criminal is assumed to know the cer-
tainty (p) and severity of punishment (s).  But is this really true? 
                                                        
that those facts are recalled, and mobilized appropriately, by the decision-maker”); see also 
Posner, supra note 12, at 1993–94 (claiming that people experiencing intense anger can-
not be deterred).  But see, e.g., Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17, at 1 (“Central to 
[Beckerian Models], and crucial for deterrence to be possible, is the rational offender as-
sumption, which maintains that would-be criminals decide whether or not to commit a 
crime by comparing the gains from the illegal act to the expected punishment.  Although 
some may doubt the validity of this assumption, there is ample empirical evidence to sup-
port it.” (citing Levitt and Miles, supra note 13)). 
 47.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing, in further detail, bounded willpower and other is-
sues analyzed in behavioral L&E). 
 48.  See Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 3, at 175–78 (discussing 
the “Legal Knowledge Hurdle” and stating: “To sum up, people rarely know the criminal 
law rules, even when those rules are formulated under the express assumption that they 
will influence conduct”).  It should be noted that there are, even if very few, economic 
analyses of law enforcement incorporating the fact that not all individuals are informed of 
legal rules and procedures.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, Optimal Deterrence, Uninformed Individu-
als, and Acquiring Information About Whether Acts Are Subject to Sanctions, 6 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 
93, 93 (1990) (discussing the significance of individuals’ “lack of knowledge about legal 
rules”); Murat C. Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies: Punishment Ought Not to Be Inflicted 
Where the Penal Provision Is Not Properly Conveyed, at 1 (Fla. State Univ. College of Law, Public 
Law Research Paper No. 505, 2012) [hereinafter Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies], 
available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1803275 (“When unin-
formed individuals are present and the punishment of the innocent is assumed to be cost-
ly, there is a trade-off between such costs and reduced levels of deterrence.”). 
 49.  See supra Part I.A. 
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Many scholars argue that potential criminals may not be very re-
sponsive to increases in the certainty and severity of punishment.  Ac-
cording to a study conducted by Professor David A. Anderson, “76% 
of active criminals and 89% of the most violent criminals either per-
ceive no risk of apprehension or are incognizant of the likely pun-
ishments for their crimes.”50  Anderson’s study is cited for the proposi-
tion that criminals are not as informed about criminal law as is 
commonly assumed.51 
Furthermore, new insights from behavioral L&E studies suggest 
that people may possess cognitive biases, such as optimism and over-
confidence, which prevent them from objectively assessing the proba-
bility with which they can experience negative events.52  These studies 
cast further doubt on the validity of the common knowledge assump-
tion, which is frequently invoked in economic analyses of law en-
forcement. 
D.  Problematic Implications 
In short, many normative economic analyses of criminal law in-
voke assumptions concerning the deterrent effect of punishment 
schemes that are not applicable in all situations.  This naturally raises 
questions as to whether normative implications of analyses invoking 
false assumptions can be taken seriously.53  Because most economic 
analyses of crime rely on a deterrence-based theory of punishment,54 
                                                        
 50.  David A. Anderson, The Deterrence Hypothesis and Picking Pockets at the Pickpocket’s 
Hanging, 4 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 295, 295 (2002); see also Richard H. McAdams & Thomas 
Ulen, Behavioral Criminal Law and Economics, in CRIMINAL LAW AND ECONOMICS 414–15 
(Nuno Garoupa ed., 2009) (briefly reviewing other empirical studies that suggest the 
common knowledge assumption does not globally hold).  But see, e.g., Miceli, Deterred or 
Detained?, supra note 17, at 1 (claiming that “there is ample empirical evidence to support” 
the assumption that offenders act rationally). 
 51.  See Robinson & Darley, Does Criminal Law Deter?, supra note 3, at 176 (citing Ander-
son, supra note 50, for this proposition). 
 52.  See infra Part IV.C (discussing cognitive biases, such as overconfidence and opti-
mism, and listing a number of relevant articles analyzing related behavioral issues). 
 53.  See, e.g., Robinson & Darley, The Role of Deterrence, supra note 3, at 952 (“Formulat-
ing criminal law rules according to a deterrence analysis can produce erroneous results if 
based upon missing or unreliable data.”). 
 54.  See infra Part II for my summary of how economic theories of law enforcement 
focus mainly on deterrence. 
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their explanatory power will naturally be limited if their assumptions 
concerning the deterrent role of punishment are false. 
Perhaps this is the reason why there are numerous tensions be-
tween the implications of simple economic analyses of crime and ex-
isting practices in criminal law.  In particular, as explained in Part III, 
economic analyses are unable to provide satisfying rationales as to (1) 
why repeat offenders are punished more severely than first time of-
fenders, (2) why there is a de facto tendency to punish less severely, 
and (3) why offenders who commit voluntary manslaughter are pun-
ished less severely than offenders who commit murder. 
Do these observations imply that economic analyses of criminal 
law can never be useful?  Not necessarily.  First, it should be noted 
that if assumptions concerning the deterrent effect of punishment 
schemes often, even if not always, hold, then such assumptions are 
not very harmful.  Second, even assuming, arguendo, that most crim-
inals do not react to incentives, economic analyses can provide useful 
insights by focusing on nondeterrence-based consequentialist theories 
of punishment, such as incapacitation.  Third, economic analyses of 
criminal law can incorporate the fact that not all individuals can be 
deterred through threats of punishment.55  In fact, as Part V demon-
strates, an economic analysis of criminal law that focuses on the se-
cond and third points provides satisfying rationales for some of the 
legal practices most people find intuitive and fair. 
Before proceeding, however, it is useful to provide a brief sum-
mary of economic theories based on deterrence compared to other 
theories of punishment.  This brief review serves several important 
functions.  First, it reveals the lack of interest shown to non-
deterrence theories.  Second, it allows the identification of different 
types of social benefits through deterrence versus incapacitation.  De-
terrence lowers present crime rates by making crime a costly option 
for potential offenders.  Incapacitation, on the other hand, lowers fu-
ture crime rates by making it impossible for criminals to commit sub-
sequent crimes while imprisoned.  Third, it hints at how the explana-
tory power of economic analyses of crime can be increased by jointly 
focusing on the incapacitative and deterrent effects of punishment.  
On one hand, an exclusively deterrence-based theory cannot provide 
justifications for imprisoning dangerous and undeterrable individuals 
for trivial reasons.  On the other hand, an exclusively incapacitation-
                                                        
 55.  See, e.g., Kaplow, supra note 48 (incorporating into economic analyses of law en-
forcement the fact that some individuals may be uninformed of legal rules and proce-
dures). 
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based theory cannot provide satisfying rationales as to why minor of-
fenses receive monetary fines, rather than imprisonment.  This fol-
lows from the simple fact that monetary fines do not have an incapaci-
tative function. 
II.  DETERRENCE, INCAPACITATION AND REHABILITATION IN NORMATIVE 
ECONOMIC ANALYSES OF CRIMINAL LAW 
It is only natural for economic analyses of crime to focus on some 
or all of the three main consequentialist justifications for punishment: 
deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation.56  But, as discussed be-
low, economic theories of crime and law enforcement focus predom-
inantly on deterrence57 and pay very little attention to rehabilitation 
and incapacitation. 
In this Article, I focus on the incapacitation and deterrence func-
tions of punishment.  I refrain from commenting on potential reha-
bilitative effects, primarily because “[i]ncarceration rarely is imposed 
today for rehabilitative (reform) purposes.”58  Unsurprisingly, norma-
tive economic analyses take a similar approach and do not focus on 
the rehabilitative effects of punishment.  This Part briefly presents a 
variety of historical, methodological, and theoretical reasons for this 
approach before proceeding to lengthier reviews of L&E analyses fo-
cusing on incapacitation and deterrence. 
                                                        
 56.  See, e.g., Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 311 (observing that “[t]he three basic measures 
of crime control most frequently discussed in the criminological literature are deterrence, 
incapacitation, and rehabilitation”). 
 57.  See Barnes, supra note 3, at 628 (suggesting that L&E scholars “bas[e] their anal-
yses primarily on only a small part of the traditional framework—deterrence”); Miceli, Can 
the Twain Meet?, supra note 17, at 1 (“Economic models of law enforcement beginning with 
Becker (1968) have primarily focused on the role of criminal punishment in deterring 
crime.”  (citing Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. 
ECON. 169 (1968))); Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 444 n.81 
(“Economists have paid much less attention to incapacitation than to deterrence, despite 
the significance of the incapacitation rationale in criminal law enforcement.”).  It is also 
remarkable that Polinsky and Shavell, in their extensive review of economic theories of 
public enforcement of law, do not even once refer to the word “rehabilitation” except 
when citing Ehrlich’s work, which contains the word “rehabilitation” in its title.  Polinsky & 
Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2; Ehrlich, supra note 19.  This reflects the fact 
that economists have largely ignored rehabilitation in their analyses, perhaps due to rea-
sons discussed in the proceeding paragraphs. 
 58.  JOSHUA DRESSLER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON CRIMINAL LAW 36 (4th ed. 2007). 
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A.  Rehabilitation Is Ignored 
Among the three potential consequentialist justifications for pun-
ishment, rehabilitation receives the least attention.  This is perhaps 
due to trends and developments in the 1970s, which led to the “trash-
ing of rehabilitation.”59  Moreover, economists may be ignoring reha-
bilitation due to its “counterdeterrent” effects identified by Isaac Ehr-
lich in his 1981 article.  According to Erlich, “[t]he reason [for this 
counterdeterrent effect] is that successful rehabilitation confers an 
implicit subsidy on potential offenders by offering training and em-
ployment benefits at public expense. . . .  [T]he rehabilitation bene-
fits provided to actual offenders ex post produce a counterdeterrent 
effect on potential offenders ex ante.”60  A third potential factor, which 
may contribute to the neglect of rehabilitation by economists, has to 
do with the problems it poses for social choice theory.61  Social choice 
                                                        
 59.  Francis T. Cullen & Paul Gendreau, Assessing Correctional Rehabilitation: Policy, Prac-
tice, and Prospects, 3 CRIM. JUST. 109, 112 (2000) (summarizing the events in the 1970s that 
led to “the abandonment of, or loss of faith in, rehabilitation as a goal of corrections” and 
questioning whether such abandonment “was deserved”); see also Alfred Blumstein, Interac-
tion of Criminological Research and Public Policy, 12 J. QUANTITATIVE CRIMINOLOGY 349, 351 
(1997); Robert Martinson, What Works?—Questions and Answers About Prison Reform, 35 PUB. 
INT. 22, 25 (1974) (providing a skeptical view of rehabilitative approaches, and stating that 
“with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been reported so far 
have had no appreciable effect on recidivism”); Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 314 (“Numerous 
studies indicate little success, if not outright failure, of most programs in bringing about 
any enduring rehabilitative outcomes for treated offenders.”). 
 60.  Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 315 (emphasis omitted).  More specifically, Ehrlich ar-
gues as follows: 
[T]he effect of rehabilitation on the equilibrium frequency of offenses is even 
more complex.  The reason is that successful rehabilitation confers an implicit 
subsidy on potential offenders by offering training and employment benefits at 
public expense.  Even if the rehabilitation programs were not carried out at the 
expense of the criminal sanctions, but rather in addition to them, the provision 
of rehabilitative net benefits—to the extent that they are positive—necessarily 
enhances the anticipated net return from crime to the potential offender . . . by 
the magnitude of the rehabilitation subsidy per offense . . . . 
Id. 
 61.  See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC THEORY 787 (2003) (“The cen-
tral question of [social choice] theory concerns the possibility of deriving the objectives of 
the policy maker as an aggregation of the preferences of the agents in the economy, and 
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theory identifies ways to aggregate individual preferences to rank the 
social desirability of various options.  As such, it provides the tools for 
normative evaluations of rules and laws.  Rehabilitation, by definition, 
involves externally incited changes to a person’s preferences.  This is 
problematic for social choice theory because the theory commonly 
considers members of society as having fixed preferences.62 
B.  Incapacitation Is Rarely Analyzed 
Normative L&E analyses of law enforcement that incorporate in-
capacitation as a justification for punishment are rare.  There is only 
one pre-2010 article by Professor Steven Shavell63 and three very re-
cent articles by Professor Thomas Miceli64 specifically focusing on in-
capacitation by using the standard normative L&E approach.  
Shavell’s article analyzes optimal punishment schemes when incapaci-
tation is the only function of punishment, and Miceli’s articles extend 
the analysis to cases where punishment has deterrent as well as inca-
pacitation effects.  To investigate why incapacitation may have been 
ignored in normative economic analyses, I first review Shavell’s 1987 
article.  Miceli’s articles are briefly reviewed in Part II.D, which dis-
cusses the effect of combining deterrence and incapacitation in L&E 
models. 
Steven Shavell conducted the single pre-2010 economic analysis 
of optimal law enforcement in 1987, in which he incorporated inca-
                                                        
of doing so in a manner that could be deemed as satisfactory according to a number of 
desiderata.”). 
 62.  In social choice theory, it is common to assume that members of society have “well 
defined preferences,” which are not manipulated through social policies such as rehabili-
tation and therefore remain constant throughout analyses.  Id. at 789. 
 63.  Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation, supra note 17, is the single pre-2010 economic study 
focusing specifically on incapacitation of which I am aware.  I am excluding Ehrlich, supra 
note 19, which also contains a brief discussion of incapacitation, but does not provide a 
complete theory as does Shavell’s 1987 article.  Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17, 
and Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, briefly review existing eco-
nomic analyses of optimal law enforcement incorporating incapacitation as a potential jus-
tification for punishment and only cite Shavell’s 1987 article.  There are, however, numer-
ous articles that consider optimal nonmonetary fines, such as imprisonment, and justify 
their use to achieve deterrence—especially when the judgment-proof-offender problem is 
a significant concern.  See infra note 73 for examples of three articles by Shavell. 
 64.  Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation, supra note 17; Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, su-
pra note 17; Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17. 
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pacitation as a potential justification for punishment.65  His article 
suggests that an offender ought to be imprisoned if and only if his po-
tential to cause harm, per unit of time free, exceeds the cost, per unit 
of time, of imprisonment.66  It follows that if an offender’s danger-
ousness is constant, he should either be imprisoned for life or not 
imprisoned at all.  This result is in sharp contrast to existing punish-
ment schemes, where offenders are generally punished with interme-
diate sentences.67  If, however, an offender’s dangerousness declines 
with age,68 it is optimal to release the offender after his dangerousness 
falls below a critical level.  Although Shavell’s model of incapacitation, 
when combined with the rehabilitative effects of aging, produces 
some sensible results,69 it appears to be incapable of producing results 
of similar quality and quantity to the standard deterrence model, 
which was “brought to its current level of maturity by” the same au-
thor and Mitchell Polinsky.70 
                                                        
 65.  For another brief review of Shavell, supra note 17, see Polinsky & Shavell, Public 
Enforcement of Law, supra note 2. 
 66.  Shavell, supra note 17, at 585–87. 
 67.  In 2006, for example, the average felony sentence to incarceration in the United 
States was three years in state prisons and jails and more than five years in the federal sys-
tem.  SEAN ROSENMERKEL ET AL., BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, FELONY SENTENCES IN 
STATE COURTS, 2006—STATISTICAL TABLES 2 (2009). 
 68.  See, e.g., Levitt & Miles, supra note 13, at 460 (citing CRIMINAL CAREERS AND 
“CAREER CRIMINALS” (Alfred Blumstein et al. eds., vol. I 1986)); Polinsky & Shavell, Public 
Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 443 (citing JAMES Q. WILSON & RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN, 
CRIME AND HUMAN NATURE (1985)). 
 69.  As Professors Levitt and Miles note, 
the predictions of Shavell’s (1987) model are broadly consistent with observed 
criminal justice policies when incapacitation is the exclusive purpose.  For ex-
ample, in Kansas v. Hendricks, 521 U.S. 346, 372–74 (1997), the Supreme Court 
upheld a state law authorizing the civil confinement of sex offenders who have 
completed their criminal sentences.  The Court concluded that further con-
finement was permissible when offenders suffered from mental abnormalities 
rendering them likely to re-offend and unlikely to be deterred by the threat of 
incarceration.  Thus, the Court has permitted in limited circumstances confine-
ment solely for the purpose of incapacitation. 
Levitt & Miles, supra note 13, at 460. 
 70.  Miceli, Deterred or Detained?, supra note 17, at 1 (referring to Polinsky & Shavell, 
Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2; Polinsky & Shavell, Economic Theory of Law Enforce-
ment, supra note 2). 
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Consider the use of monetary fines, rather than imprisonment, 
for minor offenses.71  Deterrence-based theories provide satisfying ra-
tionales as to why imprisonment should be reserved for major offens-
es.  The harm inflicted through a minor offense is, by definition, rela-
tively low.  As such, using an expensive method of deterrence, namely 
imprisonment, is not necessary to deter the infliction of such harm.  A 
degree of deterrence can be achieved by resorting to the exclusive use 
of monetary fines.  More serious crimes, however, necessitate the use 
of imprisonment or other nonmonetary fines to increase deterrence.72  
It simply pays-off to incur the expense of imprisonment to marginally 
reduce social harms inflicted through more serious crimes. 
Theories focusing only on incapacitation do not, and cannot, 
provide satisfying rationales for the exclusive use of monetary sanc-
tions.  This follows from the fact that monetary fines do not ordinarily 
prevent offenders from committing subsequent crimes.  A weak ra-
tionale can be provided for exceptional cases where the commission 
of a crime requires some financial means or investment.  But such ex-
planations certainly cannot compare to the convincing explanations 
provided by deterrence-based theories. 
C.  Deterrence: The Predominant Theory of Punishment 
As stated earlier, deterrence is the main focus of economic theo-
ries of crime.  Topics analyzed by employing economic crime and de-
terrence models range from the very general, such as the optimal use 
of monetary versus non-monetary sanctions,73 the optimal standard of 
proof in criminal trials,74 and the punishment of attempts75 to the very 
                                                        
 71.  See Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 419 (“Under the 
strict sanctioning rule . . . it never is optimal to employ a prison sentence unless the fine 
has been set as high as possible, since fines are socially cheaper sanctions. Whether it is 
optimal to use a prison sentence in addition to the maximal fine depends on the extent of 
underdeterrence that would result if fines were used alone, and the social cost of impris-
onment.”). 
 72.  Id. 
 73.  See, e.g., Mitchell A. Polinsky & Steven Shavell, The Optimal Use of Fines and Impris-
onment, 24 J. PUB. ECON. 89 (1984); Steven Shavell, Criminal Law and the Optimal Use of 
Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 85 COLUM. L. REV. 1232 (1985); Steven Shavell, The 
Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions as a Deterrent, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 584 (1987); Louis 
Kaplow, A Note on the Optimal Use of Nonmonetary Sanctions, 42 J. PUB. ECON. 245 (1990). 
 74.  See, e.g., Henrik Lando, Prevention of Crime and the Optimal Standard of Proof in Crim-
inal Law, 5 REV. L. & ECON. 33, 33 (2009); Thomas J. Miceli, Optimal Prosecution of Defend-
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specific, such as the optimal role of apologies in sentencing,76 and 
sentence enhancements for hate crimes.77  What is common among 
most normative economic analyses is the focus on the deterrent effect 
of various laws and procedures, which is implied by the assumption 
that potential criminals react to changes in criminal law rules.  As 
briefly discussed in Part I.A., normative economic theories assume 
that greater expected penalties lead to more deterrence. 
Increasing the expected punishment to achieve deterrence, how-
ever, is costly.  The most commonly identified costs in the existing lit-
erature include detection and imprisonment.78  As such, a trade-off 
emerges between reducing such costs and increasing deterrence.  
Since there are a number of variables at work, the correct trade-off 
requires a circumstance-specific approach.  The standard economic 
model of crime and deterrence is appealing and quite successful, at 
least in part, because of its ability to generate such fact-specific trade-
offs. 
Although there is a broad and sophisticated literature on the 
economics of crime and deterrence,79 a few key points are worth high-
lighting.  The main trade-off, as stated, is between reducing costs re-
quired to increase expected punishment and increasing the benefits 
associated with deterrence.  A few corollaries immediately follow.  Ce-
teris paribus, the greater the harm associated with crime, the more im-
                                                        
ants Whose Guilt Is Uncertain, 6 J.L., ECON. & ORG. 189, 189–90 (1990) (same); Murat C. 
Mungan, A Utilitarian Justification for Heightened Standards of Proof in Criminal Trials, 167 J. 
INSTITUTIONAL & THEORETICAL ECON. 352, 352 (2011); Okan Yilankaya, A Model of Evi-
dence Production and Optimal Standard of Proof and Penalty in Criminal Trials, 35 CANADIAN J. 
ECON. 385, 385 (2002); Matteo Rizzolli & Margherita Saraceno, Better That Ten Guilty Per-
sons Escape: Punishment Costs Explain the Standard of Evidence, PUB. CHOICE (forthcoming), 
available at http://dx.doi.org/10.1007/s11127-011-9867-y. 
 75.  See, e.g., Steven Shavell, Deterrence and the Punishment of Attempts, 19 J. LEGAL STUD. 
435, 436 (1990); Murat C. Mungan, Welfare Enhancing Regulation Exemptions, 31 INT’L REV. 
L. & ECON. 249, 253 (2011). 
 76.  See, e.g., Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24. 
 77.  See, e.g., Dhammika Dharmapala & Nuno Garoupa, Penalty Enhancements for Hate 
Crimes: An Economic Analysis, 6 AM. L. & ECON. REV. 185 (2004). 
 78.  See Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 450–54 (listing 
relevant existing literature). 
 79.  See supra note 2 (listing scholarship on the economics of crime and deterrence). 
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portant the benefits associated with deterrence.80  Similarly, all else 
equal, the greater the deterrent effect of punishment, the greater the 
justification for imposing punishment.81 
D.  Combining Incapacitation and Deterrence? 
This last observation highlights a caveat in deterrence-based the-
ories.  Consider a society consisting of two types of individuals: unde-
terrable criminals, and noncriminals (that is, individuals who never 
commit crime).  In such a society, deterrence based theories suggest 
that crimes should go unpunished, because punishment would have 
absolutely no deterrent effect.  As such, punishment—in an economic 
deterrence model—would only generate imprisonment and detection 
costs, without any benefits.  Therefore, in such a society, it would be 
optimal to not punish criminal acts.82 
This caveat demonstrates how the standard economic model of 
crime can benefit from the incorporation of the incapacitation func-
tion and benefit of punishment.  Imprisoning undeterrable criminals 
in such a society makes sense if one recognizes the fact that criminals 
can repeatedly commit crime,83 and that the prevention of future 
crime requires imprisonment, even if punishment has no effect of de-
terring crime in the present. 
This observation leads one to ask whether an economic model 
that combines deterrence and incapacitation can address the criti-
cisms directed at previous economic analyses of crime and have suffi-
cient explanatory power.  The answer is “no,”84 unless some of the as-
sumptions in the standard economic model of crime can be replaced 
with new and more useful ones.  To see why, consider whether such a 
                                                        
 80.  See Steven Shavell, Specific Versus General Enforcement of Law, 99 J. POL. ECON. 1088, 
1094–95 (1991) (modeling the benefits of deterrence in relation to the severity of the 
harm associated with crime). 
 81.  See Mungan, Optimal Warning Strategies, supra note 48 (constructing a model where 
the frequency and severity of the optimal sanction is increasing in the proportion of indi-
viduals who are deterrable). 
 82.  See Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17, at 32 (making the same observation: 
“the economic model offers no rationale for punishing offenders who are undeterrable”). 
 83.  A legal economist may object to this statement by claiming that crimes committed 
by undeterrable individuals may be efficient.  I address this issue in Part IV. 
 84.  For examples of models combining deterrence and incapacitation as incapable of 
providing rationales for punishing repeat offenders more severely, see Miceli, Deterrence 
and Incapacitation, supra note 17. 
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model would be capable of explaining why it makes sense to punish 
repeat offenders more severely than first-time offenders. 
In standard economic models of crime, the combined incapacita-
tive and deterrent benefits of punishing a repeat offender and pun-
ishing a first-time offender are roughly the same.  A first-time offend-
er, by committing a crime, reveals a high and constant propensity to 
commit crime.  Under this theory, committing a subsequent crime 
and becoming a repeat offender reveals very little additional infor-
mation concerning the offender’s dangerousness.85 
This implication in the standard model is best illustrated in Pro-
fessor Thomas Miceli’s recent work, which jointly analyzes deterrence 
and incapacitation in a theoretical L&E model of law enforcement.86  
Miceli’s model, however, does not fully capture the information-
exploiting feature of repeat offender laws.  Specifically, under this 
theory, a first-time offender completely reveals his dangerousness by 
committing crime.  Miceli makes a similar observation: 
[T]he threat of imprisonment deters some offenders from 
committing dangerous crimes in the first place, while those 
offenders who reveal their predilection to commit crimes in 
spite of the threatened punishment should be imprisoned 
for life on their first apprehension in order to prevent them 
from having further criminal opportunities.87 
An economic model that can provide a satisfactory explanation 
as to why repeat offenders ought to be punished more severely must 
be capable of incorporating the informative value of an offender’s 
prior record.  This cannot be achieved in standard models of crime 
and deterrence, unless some of their unrealistic assumptions are re-
                                                        
 85.  This brief analysis abstracts from the fact that more severe punishments for repeat 
offenders makes the expected costs of committing subsequent crimes higher.  Similarly, it 
abstracts from the hypothesis that stigma costs are highest for first time offenders.  See, e.g., 
Eric Rasmusen, Stigma and Self-Fulfilling Expectations of Criminality, 39 J.L. & ECON. 519, 520–
23 (1996) (theorizing that stigma is greatest in first time offenders); Patricia Funk, On the 
Effective Use of Stigma as a Crime-Deterrent, 48 EUR. ECON. REV. 715, 717 (2004) (finding that 
stigma simultaneously deters unconvicted individuals from committing crimes and en-
hances recidivism); Alon Harel & Alon Klement, The Economics of Stigma: Why More Detection 
of Crime May Result in Less Stigmatization, 36 J. LEGAL STUD. 355 (2007).  These opposing 
effects should not affect the analysis significantly. 
 86.  Miceli, Can the Twain Meet?, supra note 17. 
 87.  Id. at 32 (emphasis added). 
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placed with new, realistic and useful alternatives.88  In Part IV, I con-
sider a candidate for such a replacement, namely the substitution of 
constant criminal benefits with fluctuating criminal tendencies. Be-
fore doing so, it will be useful to describe how constant benefits are 
incorporated in standard crime and deterrence models, and what 
problems they cause. 
III.  IMPLICIT ASSUMPTION OF CONSTANT CRIMINAL TENDENCIES & 
FAILURES OF L&E AS A POSITIVE THEORY OF LAW ENFORCEMENT 
Economic theories of law enforcement focus predominantly on 
deterrence89 because normative economic analyses of incapacitation 
have not revealed many interesting results,90 and because many schol-
ars have deemed rehabilitation, the last of “[t]he three basic measures 
of crime control most frequently discussed in the criminological liter-
ature,”91 to be ineffective at reducing crime.92  Furthermore, the reluc-
tance of economists to incorporate rehabilitation in normative theo-
ries of crime reflects an implicit belief that criminals’ attitudes are 
hard to change through institutions, or at least that achieving such 
changes would have “counterdeterrent” effects.93  This implicit belief 
may have produced some spillover effects: the unwillingness of econ-
omists to consider institutionally incited changes in criminal attitudes 
may have led them to overlook or ignore the possibility that criminals’ 
attitudes may change due to internal, and possibly even external and 
random, events.  This theory is consistent with the fact that an over-
whelming majority of economic theories of crime invoke an implicit 
or explicit assumption of constant criminal tendencies. 
                                                        
 88.  Professor Miceli seems to agree with this conclusion.  He states: “[T]he current 
model with fully rational offenders provides no basis at all for waiting until the third (or 
even the second) offense to impose the maximal sentence.  Explaining this provision of 
the law therefore requires further elaboration of the basic model.”  Id.  The acknowledg-
ment of fluctuating criminal tendencies can be interpreted as the “further elaboration” 
referred to by Professor Miceli. 
 89.  See supra note 57 and accompanying text. 
 90.  See supra Part II. 
 91.  Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 311. 
 92.  See supra Part II.A. 
 93.  See supra note 60. 
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A.  Constant Criminal Tendencies Assumption 
To see how the constant criminal benefits assumption is invoked 
in standard crime and deterrence models, consider the simple Beck-
erian framework introduced in Part I.A.  In this framework, potential 
offenders are, by definition, people who have positive benefits (bs) 
from committing crime, despite the moral cost.  If a person has a non-
positive benefit, then this would immediately imply that she would be 
deterred from committing crime, even with the smallest possible ex-
pected punishment (that is, b≤0<(p x s)).  Whether potential offend-
ers (that is, people with b>0) decide to commit crime depends on 
whether the expected sanction (p x s) is sufficiently high. 
Consider David, who is often in a position where he does not 
have enough change to feed parking meters.  When he has to park his 
car and has no change, he would rather pay up to twenty-five dollars 
than drive around and find change to feed the meter.94  In this case, 
David’s illicit (though not criminal) benefit (b)95 from illegally park-
ing his car is twenty-five dollars.96  If, for instance, David estimates that 
his probability (p) of getting a parking ticket is 1/10, and the mone-
tary fine (s) for illegal parking is $100, then he chooses to park his car 
illegally whenever he does not have enough change to feed the meter. 
                                                        
 94.  Assume that David cannot find parking meters that are out of order. 
 95.  Illegal parking is a good example of how the simple Beckerian model works, alt-
hough it is considered a civil infraction and not a crime in many jurisdictions, because: (1) 
the sanction is purely monetary, (2) the monetary sanction is not high enough to trigger 
the judgment-proof-offender problem and (3) counting the offender’s benefit in the social wel-
fare calculus is less controversial than in the criminal context.  See Steven Shavell, The 
Judgment Proof Problem, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 45 (1986) (describing the judgment-proof 
problem: “Parties who cause harm to others may sometimes turn out to be ‘judgment 
proof,’ that is, unable to pay fully the amount for which they have been found legally lia-
ble.”); Becker, supra note 15 (including criminal benefits in the social welfare calculus).  
For a criticism of this approach, see George J. Stigler, The Optimum Enforcement of Laws, 78 
J. POL. ECON. 526 (1970).  A recent working paper by economics Professors Philip A. Curry 
and Matthew Doyle contributes to this debate by showing that criminal benefits may be 
irrelevant, even if accounted for, in a utilitarian framework.  Philip A. Curry & Matthew 
Doyle, Social Welfare and the Benefits to Crime (July 11, 2012), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1987177.  The discussion in the 
proceeding parts extends the analysis to more conventional crimes. 
 96.  For purposes of this example, it is harmless to ignore David’s legal compliance 
cost; he would have had to incur the cost of feeding the meter, were he to comply. 
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This follows, because his illicit benefit ($25) exceeds his expected loss 
from parking illegally ((1/10) x $100 = $10). 
Existing economic theories of law enforcement implicitly or ex-
plicitly assume that David’s illicit benefit from illegal parking is con-
stant—it is always twenty-five dollars.  This, coupled with the assump-
tion that David has perfect self-control, implies that whenever David 
has to choose between illegally parking and not parking, he will make 
the same decision, as long as the expected sanction remains the same.  
To prevent potential confusion, it should be noted that a similar con-
stancy assumption is not invoked across individuals.  As stated earlier, 
potential offenders are assumed to differ from each other in their il-
licit benefits.  Another person, Jay, may have an illicit benefit of five 
dollars from illegal parking.  The assumption of constant benefits re-
fers to Jay’s and David’s unchanging benefits from illegal parking of 
twenty-five dollars and five dollars, respectively. 
The reliance on constant illicit benefits is best demonstrated in 
the broad and expanding economic analysis of optimal punishment 
of repeat offenders.  Such analysis considers models in which poten-
tial offenders are assumed to have multiple opportunities to commit 
an illegal act.  Those who are caught multiple times committing the 
offense are called repeat offenders.  Economic models are used to de-
termine conditions under which repeat offenders ought to be pun-
ished more severely than first-time offenders.97  Often, the assumption 
of constant benefits is invoked implicitly98 by assigning the same bene-
fits (b) to individuals across multiple opportunities.  Sometimes the 
assumption is invoked explicitly. The best example is Polinsky and 
Shavell’s 1998 article on repeat offenders,99 which summarizes the as-
sumption that individuals differ from each other in their illicit and 
                                                        
 97.  For a short list of articles taking this approach, see supra note 12. 
 98.  See, e.g., Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra note 24, at 174–76 (presenting a two-
period crime and deterrence model, where potential offenders have two opportunities to 
engage in an illegal act).  As is evident from the analysis, potential offenders are assumed 
to derive the same expected benefit from committing the offense in each period.  This as-
sumption of constant benefits is not explicitly stated in the article. 
 99.  See Polinsky and Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21.  See also Miceli, Deterrence 
and Incapacitation, supra note 17, at 205 (invoking the constant benefit assumption explicit-
ly: “Assume that potential offenders have infinite life spans.  At time zero, they each take a 
random draw of the monetary gain from committing a crime, g, which is distributed by the 
density function z(g).  Each offender’s realized g will remain his “type” throughout his life 
(thus, each offender will make the same choice each time he is confronted with a criminal 
opportunity).”). 
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constant benefits: “The magnitude of the benefit is the same in both 
periods for a given individual but varies among individuals.”100 
One can imagine many reasons why the assumption of constant 
benefits from crime is unrealistic.101  Jay, being a patient person, may 
on average have an illicit benefit from illegal parking of five dollars.  
But what if he is in a hurry?  What if he is hungry, or angry?  In these 
situations, his benefit from illegal parking may greatly exceed five dol-
lars.  Thus, Jay’s benefits vary based on circumstances.  Such variation 
implies fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal tendencies. 
A second source of fluctuation in criminal tendencies is related 
to variations in individuals’ self-control.  Even if a person’s true bene-
fit from an illegal act remains constant, he may still commit it today 
and refrain from committing it tomorrow.  For instance, a person, 
who is ordinarily deterred from attacking people he hates (due to ex-
pected sanctions), may temporarily lose his ability to compare costs 
and benefits when he is provoked.  In these cases, criminal benefits 
and tendencies may diverge.  Such divergences are discussed in fur-
ther detail in Part IV. 
In short, law enforcement models make use of the unrealistic as-
sumption that people have constant criminal tendencies.  Economists 
always make use of simplifying assumptions,102 and unrealistic assump-
tions are expected to some extent.  The real question is not whether 
                                                        
 100.  Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 307.  The authors note that 
their results would not be affected if they were to assume random benefits from crime, 
showing that they have not overlooked, but assumed away, random benefits from crime, 
presumably because the incorporation of random benefits does not add anything and 
over-complicates their analysis.  Polinsky and Shavell’s effort to assume away random bene-
fits is harmless, mainly because the model is deterrence-based and does not formally in-
corporate incapacitation.  In fact, the authors acknowledge that if incapacitation were con-
sidered in the model, then information on prior offenses could be used to evaluate the 
propensity of an individual to commit crime.  In Part V, I argue that criminal records pro-
vide relevant information about a repeat offender’s propensity to commit crime only when 
people have fluctuating tendencies to commit crime. 
 101.  See Posner, supra note 12 (describing a number of reasons why potential offenders 
may have different tendencies to commit crime at different points in time related to their 
emotional states). 
 102.  See, e.g., Miceli, Deterrence and Incapacitation, supra note 17, at 205 (assuming that 
“offenders are infinitely lived and potentially commit crimes throughout their lives”); 
Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra note 24, at 174 (assuming that “[s]ociety consists of indi-
viduals who are continuously distributed over benefits”). 
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an unrealistic assumption was used but whether the assumption af-
fected results that can be applied to the real world. 
To demonstrate that the assumption of constant tendencies is 
not only simplifying but misleading, I proceed by summarizing a 
number of conclusions derived from law enforcement models that 
make use of constant tendencies and that are in tension with various 
legal practices.  In Part V, I argue that this tension disappears when 
one relaxes the assumption of constant criminal tendencies. 
B.  Divergences Between Normative L&E and Actual Legal Practices 
Despite L&E’s success as a legal discipline,103 there are some im-
portant conflicts between the suggestions of normative L&E theories 
and actual law enforcement mechanisms and practices.  This suggests 
that (1) some legal practices are sub-optimal, and/or (2) existing 
L&E theories make use of simplifying assumptions that are mislead-
ing. 
An extensive body of literature has investigated whether legal, 
and in particular common law, institutions converge to efficiency over 
time through some process of sociolegal or institutional evolution.104  
I do not enter this debate in this Article; instead I focus on a more 
modest issue.  Specifically, I investigate whether it is possible to rec-
oncile existing legal practices with the implications of L&E models by 
relaxing a simplifying assumption, namely the constancy of criminal 
tendencies.  As such, I focus on (2) above. 
I hope to demonstrate the divergence between the implications 
of L&E models and actual legal practices in three specific areas: (1) 
punishment of repeat offenders, (2) treatment of remorse and apolo-
gies, and (3) punishment of voluntary manslaughter. 
1.  Punishment of Repeat Offenders 
“In practice, the law often sanctions repeat offenders more se-
verely than first-time offenders.”105  The 2011 Federal Sentencing 
Guidelines, for instance, categorize offenders based on their criminal 
records and call for longer sentences for criminals with longer rec-
                                                        
 103.  See supra note 1 and accompanying text. 
 104.  See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa & Carlos Gómez Ligüerre, The Evolution of the Common Law 
and Efficiency, 40 GA. J. INT’L & COMP. L. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1805141. 
 105.  Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense History, supra note 21, at 305. 
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ords.106  The Clean Water Act similarly punishes repeat offenders by 
doubling the maximum criminal fines and sentences for negligent vi-
olations of various sections of the Act.107  State criminal statutes also 
call for increased sentences for repeat offenders through three strike 
laws.108 
The implications of L&E studies are not as uniform, and do not 
always suggest that repeat offenders should be punished more severe-
ly.  The simplest model of deterrence, for instance, suggests that de-
tection history should be completely irrelevant for determining opti-
mal sentences: 
If the [expected] sanction for polluting and causing a 
$1,000 harm is $1,000, then any person who pollutes and 
pays $1,000 is a person whose gain from polluting (say the 
savings from not installing pollution control equipment) 
must have exceeded $1,000.  Social welfare therefore is 
higher as a result of his polluting.  If such an individual pol-
luted and was sanctioned in the past, that only means that it 
was socially desirable for him to have polluted previously.  
Raising the sanction because of his having a record of prior 
convictions would overdeter him now.109 
                                                        
 106.  The guidelines require a complicated examination of the criminal’s previous rec-
ord for purposes of determining her “criminal history category.”  There are six such cate-
gories, where category I is reserved for “inexperienced” criminals and category VI is for 
what may be called “habitual criminals.”  The appropriate sentence for a given crime is 
generally longer for a criminal in category VI than a criminal in category I (unless the of-
fense in question is level 1, 42, or 43.  In these cases both categories are assigned the same 
sentence: between 0–6 months for level 1, 360 months to life for level 42, and life for level 
43).  Sentencing Table, 2011 FED. SENTENCING GUIDELINES, available at http://www.ussc. 
gov/Guidelines/2011_guidelines/Manual_PDF/Sentencing_Table.pdf. 
 107.  33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(1). 
 108.  See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 667 (1994); GA. CODE § 17-10-7(c) (2012); MD. CODE, 
CRIM. LAW § 14-101(d)(1) (2007). 
 109.  Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 438.  It should be 
noted that this explanation as to why criminal history should not play a role in the simple 
crime and deterrence model implicitly relies on the offender’s benefit being constant, 
namely $1,000 in the past and in the present.  It also relies on offenders’ benefits entering 
into the social calculus.  See supra note 95. 
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This explanation, of course, is valid only under a set of simplify-
ing assumptions.110  Many scholars have extended the basic Beckerian 
framework in various dimensions to analyze punishment schemes in 
richer settings.111  Such extensions, however, have not always led to re-
sults that are consistent with actual practices.  In fact, some economic 
models suggest that it may be a good idea to punish first-time offend-
ers more severely than repeat offenders.112  Other models provide ra-
tionales as to why it may make sense to punish repeat offenders more 
severely for purposes of achieving optimal deterrence.113  These ra-
tionales, however, usually rely on restrictive conditions, and the re-
sults have limited applicability.114 
The mixed and qualified implications of L&E studies of optimal 
punishments for repeat offenders have led scholars to perceive the 
problem as a “puzzle.”115  The puzzling status of escalating punish-
ments for repeat offenders in the L&E literature places it in sharp 
contrast with the wide approval for punishing repeat offenders more 
severely in actual practice. 
                                                        
 110.  Polinsky and Shavell also describe the various simplifying assumptions at work.  
Polinsky & Shavell, Public Enforcement of Law, supra note 2, at 65–66 & 72 n.80. 
 111.  See, e.g., Garoupa, Organized Crime, supra note 15, at 278 (examining organized 
crime within the Beckerian framework). 
 112.  See, e.g., Emons, supra note 24, at 254. 
 113.  See, e.g., Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra note 24, at 173. 
 114.  See Thomas J. Miceli & Catherine Bucci, A Simple Theory of Increasing Penalties for 
Repeat Offenders, 1 REV. L. & ECON. 71, 78 (2005) (“[T]his justification for escalating penal-
ties, like earlier theories, seems to apply to a fairly restrictive set of circumstances—
specifically, crimes that should definitely be deterred.”); Mungan, Repeat Offenders, supra 
note 24, at 173 (constructing a model where escalating punishments are optimal only if 
offenders “learn how to evade the detection mechanism employed by the government”); 
C.Y. Cyrus Chu et al., Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely, 20 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 127, 
127, 135 (2000) (demonstrating that increasing penalties are better than uniform penal-
ties, without comparing them to decreasing penalties); Polinsky & Shavell, On Offense His-
tory, supra note 21, at 66–67 (constructing a model based on less restrictive assumptions, 
but providing a rationale for slightly different sanction schemes than escalating punish-
ment schemes for repeat offenders). 
 115.  See, e.g., David A. Dana, Rethinking the Puzzle of Escalating Penalties for Repeat Offend-
ers, 110 YALE L.J. 733, 737 (2001) (stating that “the phenomenon of escalating penalties 
based on offense history presents an even greater puzzle from an economic perspective 
than has been previously recognized”); Emons, supra note 12, at 254 (referring to the pun-
ishment of repeat offenders more severely as a puzzle). 
  
190 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:156 
2.  Remorse and Apologies 
Remorse can be a mitigating factor in determining a criminal’s 
punishment.116  Although the instances in which the Federal Sentenc-
ing Guidelines call for a reduction in sentences due to manifestations 
of remorse are very limited,117 a number of states may “permit the use 
of remorse as a mitigating factor.”118  Perhaps more importantly, man-
ifestations of remorse, such as apologies, can affect the way judges ex-
ercise discretion in sentencing criminals.119  In fact, a number of pre-
vious studies discuss how judges are tempted to impose shorter 
sentences when they are convinced that an offender is remorseful.120 
                                                        
 116.  U.S. SENTENCING GUIDELINES MANUAL § 5K2.16 (2011). 
 117.  See id. (“[D]ownward departure under this section might be considered where a 
defendant, motivated by remorse, discloses an offense that otherwise would have remained 
undiscovered.”).  But such sentence reductions are more closely related to the “voluntary 
disclosure of offense” than the manifestation of remorse.  As such, these sentence reduc-
tions are completely consistent with the suggestions of economic studies of law enforce-
ment, which advocate a reduction in penalty for self-reporters.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow & 
Steven Shavell, Optimal Law Enforcement with Self-Reporting of Behavior, 102 J. POL. ECON. 583, 
603 (1994) (finding that “increasing incentives for reporting harmful acts would induce 
more reporting and raise welfare”).  This makes sense from a purely economic perspective 
because by self-reporting a person increases his probability of being caught from some 
smaller probability to one, which reduces the necessity of imposing costly sanctions to de-
ter the criminal.  This does not necessarily imply, however, that apologies should lead to 
sentence reductions.  See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 179 n.5 (arguing that self-
reporting and apologies can be unbundled). 
 118.  Paul H. Robinson et al., Extralegal Punishment Factors: A Study of Forgiveness, Hard-
ship, Good-Deeds, Apology, Remorse, and Other Such Discretionary Factors in Assessing Criminal 
Punishment, in SCHOLARSHIP AT PENN LAW, March 29, 2011, at 7, available at 
http://lsr.nellco.org/upenn_wps/362 (citing State v. Trostle, 951 P.2d 869, 887 (Ariz. 
1997); Jackson v. State, 684 So. 2d 1213, 1238 (Miss. 1996); State v. Allen, 994 P.2d 728, 
764 (N.M. 2000); Pope v. State, 441 So. 2d 1073, 1078 (Fla. 1983); FLA. STAT. 
§ 921.0026(2)(j) (2012)). 
 119.  Stephanos Bibas & Richard A. Bierschbach, Integrating Remorse and Apology into 
Criminal Procedure, 114 YALE L.J. 85, 99 (2004). 
 120.  See, e.g., id. (“[J]udges heed expressions of remorse and apology and weigh them 
heavily at sentencing.”); STANTON WHEELER ET AL., SITTING IN JUDGMENT: THE 
SENTENCING OF WHITE-COLLAR CRIMINALS 115 (1988) (reviewing empirical research and 
finding that “it is important for many judges that defendants recognize the gravity of their 
offense, accept the blame for their misdeeds, and express remorse or contrition for 
them”). 
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Consequentialist approaches studying the proper role of remorse 
and its manifestations in the criminal justice system, however, suggest 
that they should not be used as mitigating factors.121  Under simple 
consequentialist analyses focusing exclusively on deterrence, this fol-
lows because remorse is by definition an ex post concept, and there-
fore it should be irrelevant for deterring criminals ex ante.122  In addi-
tion, apologies are viewed as mere “cheap talk”123 making them “non-
informative of an individual’s conscious state”124 and non-credible.125  
Furthermore, the prospect of reducing a sentence for apologizing de-
creases deterrence.126  Finally, a system in which convincing apologies 
lead to reduced penalties generates asymmetric incentives for poten-
tial offenders because of the difficulty in “sort[ing] out the truly re-
morseful defendant from the unrepentant but savvy defendant.”127  As 
demonstrated by a number of articles, asymmetric incentives can lead 
to costs associated with under- as well as over-deterrence.128 
In short, there is a divergence between the way remorse and 
apologies are treated in the criminal justice system, and the way they 
ought to be treated according to simple but meticulous consequen-
tialist analyses of manifestations of remorse. 
3.  Voluntary Manslaughter 
Voluntary manslaughter is punished less severely than murder.129  
From a simple deterrence-based L&E perspective, such reductions 
appear to be problematic.  Unless the degree of control one can exert 
fluctuates over time and circumstances, it is hard to understand why 
the law reduces the punishment for killing when committed in the 
“heat of passion,” without sufficient “cooling time” and produced by 
                                                        
 121.  See supra note 24. 
 122.  Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 181. 
 123.  Robert H. Frank, Departures from Rational Choice: With and Without Regret, in THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 25 (Francesco Parisi & Vernon L. Smith 
eds., 2005). 
 124.  See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 178. 
 125.  Ward, supra note 24, at 132. 
 126.  See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24, at 178 (“Imposing lower sanctions on those 
who convincingly display remorse will therefore have an effect of lowering the expected 
punishment.”). 
 127.  Ward, supra note 24, at 164. 
 128.  See, e.g., Shavell, supra note 75, at 446–47; Mungan, supra note 75, at 249. 
 129.  See supra note 23. 
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an “adequate provocation.”130  It is, therefore, not surprising that the 
deterrence-based justification for such reductions, offered by Eric 
Posner, relies on a variant of fluctuating criminal tendencies.131 
The consequentialist rationale identified by Posner for punishing 
voluntary manslaughter less severely than murder focuses on the fact 
that voluntary manslaughter is generally hard—and sometimes impos-
sible—to deter.132  As such, reductions in punishment are justified be-
cause “expensive sanctions should not be wasted on people who can-
not be deterred by them.”133  This reasoning relies on the fact that 
people experience intense anger under extraordinary circumstances 
and, under the stimulus of such emotions, are very unresponsive to 
punishment and therefore hard to deter.134  Accordingly, Posner’s ra-
tionale relies on people being less able to exert control over their ac-
tions when they find themselves in extraordinary circumstances, 
which violates the constant benefit assumption discussed earlier.135 
Although Posner’s rationale is very appealing, it has a caveat that 
can be exploited by scholars who disfavor consequentialist approach-
es.  A criticism of Posner’s claim can be formulated in a few steps.  
First, since courts cannot perfectly identify whether people were un-
deterrable at the time they committed crime, they must rely on blunt 
proxies to decide whether a killing should be classified as voluntary 
manslaughter.136  Second, since such blunt proxies are overinclusive, 
they classify some killings committed by deterrable individuals as vol-
untary manslaughter.  Therefore, sanction reductions for voluntary 
manslaughter may lower deterrence for individuals who are indeed 
deterrable.137  Furthermore, individuals who are less responsive to 
                                                        
 130.  See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305 (summarizing what constitutes volun-
tary manslaughter). 
 131.  Posner, supra note 12, at 1978.  The concept of fluctuating criminal tendencies is 
explained further in Part IV. 
 132.  Id. at 1993–95. 
 133.  Id. at 1994. 
 134.  Id. at 1995. 
 135.  See supra Part III.A. 
 136.  See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305 (observing that “[h]omicide law typi-
cally grades a certain class of emotional killings as voluntary manslaughter rather than 
murder”). 
 137.  See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 310 (“But how can a consequentialist be 
sure that the savings from relaxing one offender’s punishment on this ground will not be 
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punishment, but not completely undeterrable, may require penalty 
enhancements to be deterred from committing crime.138 
Posner’s argument can be strengthened in a framework that in-
corporates the incapacitation function of punishment as well as fluc-
tuating criminal tendencies.139 
C.  Constant Criminal Tendencies and Their Role in the Divergences 
Between Normative L&E and Actual Legal Practices 
So far, I have demonstrated that there is a divergence between 
what simple law enforcement models suggest the law ought to be, and 
how the law actually manifests itself.140  Simple law enforcement mod-
els rely on the assumption that criminals have constant criminal 
tendencies,141 which may be responsible for the divergences between 
normative L&E and actual legal practices.  But is it? 
Section V demonstrates that the implications of economic mod-
els capable of producing fluctuating criminal tendencies are more 
consistent with actual legal practices and intuitions.  It should be not-
ed that a simple departure from constant criminal tendencies is, in 
most cases, insufficient to achieve these results.142  In addition to in-
corporating fluctuating criminal tendencies, it is also necessary to 
move from a simple deterrence-based framework to one that incorpo-
rates the deterrence and incapacitation functions of criminal justice 
systems.143  As such, fluctuating criminal tendencies, as defined in Part 
IV, are necessary—but not sufficient—to provide economic justifica-
tions for the practices summarized in Part III. 
                                                        
offset by the deterrence-undermining effects of such a disposition on the behavior of oth-
ers who find themselves in such situations for the first time?”). 
 138.  See, e.g., Moin A. Yahya, Deterring Roper’s Juveniles: Using a Law and Economics Ap-
proach to Show That the Logic of Roper Implies That Juveniles Require the Death Penalty More 
Than Adults, 111 PENN. ST. L. REV. 53, 65 (2006) (arguing that severe penalties, such as the 
death penalty, are required and justified to deter juveniles, who may be harder to deter 
than adults). 
 139.  See supra Part V. 
 140.  See supra Part III.B. 
 141.  See supra Part I.D. 
 142.  See notes 136–138 and accompanying text. 
 143.  See supra Part II.D. 
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IV.  INTEGRATING FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL TENDENCIES INTO THE 
ECONOMIC THEORY OF CRIME 
People may have fluctuating, rather than constant, criminal 
tendencies for two reasons.  First, people may have different benefits 
from the same illegal activity at different points in time.  Second, 
people may possess different degrees of self-control at different points 
in time. 
This Part, for pedagogical reasons, begins by focusing on the first 
factor, and formalizes how fluctuating criminal tendencies can be in-
corporated into standard L&E models.144  Then, in Part IV.C, I draw 
on insights from the behavioral L&E literature to incorporate the se-
cond factor, namely that people may lack perfect self-control. 
A.  Incorporating Fluctuating Tendencies 
Standard crime and deterrence models assume that a person’s 
tendency to commit crime is defined through his constant benefits 
from crime.145  Using the previously introduced framework, a person 
commits a crime if his constant benefit (b) exceeds the expected pun-
ishment from the crime (p x s).146  This framework can be altered easi-
ly to incorporate fluctuating criminal tendencies: instead of assuming 
that b is constant, one can assume that it is a random variable.147 
                                                        
 144.  See infra Parts IV.A, B. 
 145.  See Gary S. Becker, Crime and Punishment: An Economic Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 
169, 176 (1968) (observing that “[s]ome persons become ‘criminals,’ therefore, not be-
cause their basic motivation differs from that of other persons, but because their benefits 
and costs differ”). 
 146.  See supra Part I.A. 
 147.  A random variable describes the outcome generated through a stochastic or ran-
dom process.  “Consider an experiment in which a person is selected at random from 
some population and her height in inches is measured.  This height is a random variable.” 
PROBABILITY AND STATISTICS 98 (Morris H. DeGroot & Mark J. Schervish eds., 2002).  By 
using mathematics, a more precise definition can be provided: 
Consider an experiment for which the sample space is denoted by S [i.e. 
Pr(S)=1, where Pr(X) denotes the probability of X occurring]. A real-valued 
function that is defined on the space S is called a random variable.  In other 
words, in a particular experiment a random variable X would be some function 
that assigns a real number X(s) to each possible outcome s∈S. 
Id. at 97.  Part IV discusses how fluctuating criminal tendencies can be modeled by making 
use of random variables. 
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Random variables take on values through stochastic processes.  
To be more specific, consider the previous example involving Jay and 
illegal parking.  Jay may have a certain tendency to park illegally un-
der normal circumstances, but this tendency may be greater when he 
is impatient or in a hurry.  The instant purpose is not to elaborate on 
specific conditions that may change Jay’s illicit benefits,148 but to iden-
tify a simple way to incorporate his fluctuating criminal tendencies in 
standard economic theories of crime, namely by converting b into a 
random variable. 
To exemplify how random variables can be included in standard 
economic theories of crime, let us begin by making the extreme as-
sumption that Jay only has three psychological states: calm, impatient, 
and frustrated.  Let us also assume that his benefits in these three states 
are $5, $20, and $30, respectively.  Assume further that half of the 
time Jay is calm, a quarter of the time he is impatient, and the other 
quarter of the time he is frustrated.  In this case, Jay’s fluctuating illicit 
benefits can be represented by the probability function149 depicted in 
Figure 1. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 148.  See Posner, supra note 12, at 1981–82 (providing a detailed discussion as to why 
individuals’ criminal tendencies may fluctuate). 
 149.  For probability functions, see DeGroot et al., supra note 147, at 99.  Here, Jay’s 
benefit from illegal parking can take on a finite number of values, namely three.  To re-
flect this fact an economist would say that Jay’s benefit from illegal parking is a discrete ran-
dom variable.  More precisely and generally “[i]t is said that a random variable X has a dis-
crete distribution or that X is a discrete random variable if X can take only a finite number k of 
different values x1, . . . ,xk or, at most an infinite sequence of different values x1, x2, . . . .”  
Id.  To describe probabilities with which a discrete random variable takes on specific val-
ues, we use probability functions (“PF”).  It follows that “the probability function . . . of X is 
defined as the function f such that for every real number x, f(x)=Pr(X=x).”  Id.  Using this 
notation the PF describing Jay’s illicit benefits can be expressed as: 
0.5 if x=5 
f(x)= 0.25 if x=20 
0.25 if x=30 
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 Figure 1 compares the expected fine from illegal parking ($10) 
with Jay’s illicit benefits when he is calm ($5), impatient ($20), and 
frustrated ($30).  Since Jay’s illicit benefits exceed the expected fine 
from illegal parking when he is either impatient or frustrated, and 
since he is impatient or frustrated half of the time, Jay will decide to 
park illegally half of the time when he does not have sufficient change 
to feed the meter.  This frequency, through no coincidence, corre-
sponds to the probability obtained by summing the heights of the 
boxes to the right of the expected fine (that is, $10) in Figure 1: 
¼+¼=½. 
It is plausible to assume, of course, that in reality people do not 
have three potential psychological states but many, perhaps an infi-
nite number.150  To incorporate this assumption, we can allow b to 
take on an infinite number of values. Furthermore, for expositional 
purposes,151 we may assume that b is distributed around a certain value 
most of the time and that it rarely deviates from that value significant-
ly.  Specifically, we may assume that Jay’s benefits from illegal parking 
vary between $0 and $30,152 and that most of the time his benefits are 
                                                        
 150.  As Posner also observes, people may experience emotions with different intensities 
(for example, one may be very angry, angry, slightly angry, not angry at all, etc.).  See Pos-
ner, supra note 12, at 1980. 
 151.  The exact distribution obviously depends on the person and the illegal activity in 
question.  The purpose here is to give an example of how b can potentially be distributed.  
The arguments in the next Part do not rely on these specific assumptions.  See infra Part 
IV.B. 
 152.  It is implicitly assumed that Jay’s benefits can take on any real number between 0 
and 30.  If benefits are assumed to take on values corresponding to whole dollars, for in-
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between $4 and $6.  In this case Jay’s probability density function 
(“PDF”)153 over illegal parking can be represented by the following 
graph. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
When a PDF is used, as in Figure 2, to represent Jay’s fluctuating 
tendency to park illegally, the probability with which Jay’s illegal ben-
efit exceeds the expected fine can no longer be measured by focusing 
on the height of the boxes representing probabilities, as in the discrete 
distribution154 case represented by Figure 1.  Instead, we must focus on 
the area that lies below the PDF and to the right of $10.  The size of 
this area, that is, Area A in Figure 2, represents the probability with 
which Jay’s illegal benefit exceeds the expected fine of $10.  It should 
also be noted that since Jay’s benefit from illegal parking is assumed 
to always lie between $0 and $30, the entire area below the PDF in 
Figure 2 (shaded in gray) corresponds to a probability of one. 
                                                        
stance, then his benefits can take on only thirty-one different values, that is, $0, $1, $2, . . . 
$28, $29, $30), in which case a PF, as in Figure 1, would better represent Jay’s fluctuating 
benefits from illegal parking. 
 153.  Since Jay’s benefit “can assume every value in an interval” it has a “continuous dis-
tribution.”  DeGroot et al., supra note 147, at 103.  More generally, “[i]t is said that a ran-
dom variable X has a continuous distribution or that X is a continuous random variable if there 
exists a nonnegative function f, defined on the real line, such that for every subset A of the 
real line, the probability that X takes a value in A is the integral of f over the set A.”  Id.  For 
instance, if A=(4,6], then Pr(4 < 𝑥 ≤ 6)
“The function f is called the probability density function . . . of X.”  Id. 
 154.  See supra note 149. 
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B.  Multiple Potential Offenders with Fluctuating Tendencies 
So far, we have focused on the potential illicit benefits of a single 
person (namely Jay).  But, as stated in Part III, different individuals 
may have different tendencies to commit crime, or, in our example, 
park illegally.  These differences in tendencies can be represented by 
making use of multiple PDFs, one for each individual in society. 
Consider, for instance, David, a person who is more likely than 
Jay to park illegally, because he is, on average, less patient (or values 
his time more).  David’s tendency to park illegally can be captured by 
a PDF that assigns high probabilities to greater benefits from parking 
illegally.  Figure 3 demonstrates how different PDFs can be used to 
represent individuals with different tendencies to park illegally. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
As can be inferred from Figure 3, David is more likely to park il-
legally than Jay, because his benefit from illegal parking is more likely 
to exceed the expected fine of $10.  Specifically, Area D (the dotted 
area) is greater than Area J (the semi-transparent gray area) in Figure 
3, which respectively represent the probabilities with which David and 
Jay will have benefits from illegal parking exceeding $10. 
These examples focus on illegal parking, because it is an “of-
fense” that many people have committed, perhaps multiple times.  As 
such, most people can relate to the idea of having fluctuating benefits 
or tendencies by reflecting on their own experiences with illegal park-
ing. 
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C.  Insights from Behavioral Economics and Divergences Between 
Criminal Tendencies and Benefits 
Previously, when referring to illegal parking, I characterized the 
offender’s fluctuating tendency to park illegally as a direct result of 
fluctuations in his actual benefits from parking.155  This was mainly for 
pedagogical reasons, and to introduce fluctuating tendencies in an 
easily comprehensible way.  It is not hard to imagine that people may 
temporarily act in ways that do not serve their best interests.  In such 
cases, criminal tendencies and benefits diverge. 
When it comes to battery, for example, many people presumably 
have criminal benefits distributed around zero.  Yet there are excep-
tional cases where the same people have significantly high criminal 
tendencies: a person who is hungry and hypoglycemic may be tempt-
ed to attack a person who she finds irritating;156 a fanatic soccer team 
supporter may temporarily find it in his best interest to attack a per-
son insulting his team;157 a person who comes home and finds his wife 
in bed with another person may lose control and attack that person or 
his wife.158 
                                                        
 155.  See supra Part IV.A. 
 156.  See, e.g., Winchell v. Guy, 857 N.E.2d 1024, 1026 (Ind. Ct. App. 2006) (describing a 
fight that broke out in a drive thru lane of a Taco Bell because a hungry woman yelled at 
the driver in front of her for taking too long while placing his order).  Of course, this par-
ticular justification has also been used in the reverse. See Eileen A. Scallen & William E. 
Wiethoff, The Ethos of Expert Witnesses: Confusing the Admissibility, Sufficiency and Credibility of 
Expert Testimony, 49 HASTINGS L.J. 1143, 1161 (1998) (describing the “Twinky defense,” 
where accused murderer Dan White attributed his killing the San Francisco Mayor George 
Moscone and Harvey Milk to eating a large amount of sugary pastries). 
 157.  See Lindsay M. Korey Lefteroff, Excessive Heckling and Violent Behavior at Sporting 
Events: A Legal Solution?, 14 U. MIAMI BUS. L. REV. 119, 134–35 (2005) (“Some [soccer] 
venues have even installed moats around the soccer pitch to distance unruly fans from 
game officials and players, who are often the primary targets of the fans’ fury.”). 
 158.  For an example, see Lynn Hecht Schafran, There’s No Accounting for Judges, 58 ALB. 
L. REV. 1063 (1995).  She relays this story: 
On February 8, 1994, a Maryland trucker named Kenneth Peacock came home 
unexpectedly during a winter storm and found his wife in bed with another man.  
For several hours Peacock argued with his wife while drinking wine and beer.  
Then he shot her in the head with a hunting rifle.  Peacock plead guilty to vol-
untary manslaughter. 
Id. at 1063 (footnote omitted). 
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These observations reveal the fact that people have fluctuating 
criminal tendencies.  How one interprets criminal tendencies vis-à-vis 
criminal benefits, however, may have important implications concern-
ing the desirability of various punishment schemes from a consequen-
tialist perspective, even if under a limited set of circumstances.159 
In particular, if one includes criminal benefits in the social wel-
fare calculus,160 then one cannot immediately rule out the possibility 
that individuals with high tendencies to commit crime are committing 
efficient crimes.161  Specifically, if the expected punishment for a crime 
is set at a significantly high level and a person is still not deterred 
from committing that crime, one may incorrectly conclude that the 
crime must have been efficient.162  Because I invoke assumptions that 
contradict this conclusion, I first explain why it is incorrect. 
                                                        
 159.  The interpretation is irrelevant if criminal benefits are not included in the social 
welfare calculus.  See supra note 95.  This follows trivially, because what matters is not 
whether and how much the criminal benefits from his actions, but simply his likelihood or 
tendency to commit crime.  Moreover, even if criminal benefits are included in the social 
welfare calculus, the distinction is unimportant in cases where the harm associated with 
the crime is not exceeded by any potential offender’s benefit from crime.  In this case, 
there are always benefits from deterrence as well as incapacitation, which is the main ob-
servation that I rely on in conducting the analysis in Part V.  The only case where the ab-
sence of divergences between benefits and tendencies may have a substantial effect on the 
analysis is when criminal benefits are included in the social welfare calculus and there are 
criminals whose benefits exceed the harm inflicted through crime.  In this particular case, 
interpreting tendencies as occasionally diverging from benefits supports my analysis.  This 
is the case analyzed in the proceeding paragraphs. 
 160.  See supra note 95. 
 161.  A crime is defined to be efficient if the social harm from the crime is exceeded by 
the criminal benefits enjoyed by the criminal.  See Becker, supra note 145, at 180–82 (ex-
plaining efficient crimes).  With crimes leading to monetary losses, it is easy to see how a 
crime can be efficient.  If the only loss—all direct and indirect costs included—created by 
the crime is worth $100, and if the criminal is willing to pay $101 to commit that crime, the 
crime is efficient.  For other, more serious offenses, such as murder, the harm inflicted 
through crime is extreme, and it may be plausible to assume that no criminal benefit can 
exceed the harm inflicted through murder.  But this Article does not make this assump-
tion because it does not appear to be necessary.  Instead, I am making the weaker assump-
tion that—at any relevant punishment level—serious crimes committed by offenders are, 
on average, inefficient.  I support and explain this assumption in further detail in the pro-
ceeding paragraphs. 
 162.  This is a commonly invoked argument in the law enforcement literature.  Its sim-
plest form can be stated more discretely as follows: If h is the harm from crime, p is the 
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There are at least three reasons as to why the commission of a 
crime, despite very high penalties, does not imply that the criminal 
possesses benefits that exceed the harm inflicted through crime.  
First, some criminals, even if they are completely rational, are nonde-
terrable.  Some criminals simply do not view imprisonment as a signif-
icant punishment.163  The fact that such a person commits crime de-
spite an expected sentence of 100 years does not imply that the crime 
committed by this person is efficient.164 
The two remaining reasons come from behavioral economics, 
which studies how people systematically deviate from common as-
sumptions invoked in standard economic analyses and how “human 
beings make systematic mistakes in their decision making.”165  Systemat-
ic mistakes occurring due to cognitive biases166 and bounded willpower167 
appear to account for departures from the deterrability and common 
knowledge assumptions discussed in Parts I.B. and I.C., respectively, 
                                                        
probability, and s the severity of punishment, then setting s=h/p implies that a risk-neutral 
potential offender will commit crime, if and only if, his benefit exceeds the harm from 
crime, which makes the crime efficient.  But see infra note 164 (showing why this argument 
does not generalize to cases where sanctions have differential deterrent effects on people). 
 163.  Consider, for instance, the case of Earl Albert Moore, an attempted bombing sus-
pect, who, according to his former son-in-law “did what he did because he wanted to go 
back to prison.”  Jeffrey Wolf & Will Ripley, Relative: Southwest Plaza Mall Bomb Suspect 
‘Wanted to Go Back to Prison,’ 9NEWS.COM (Apr. 26, 2011), http://www.9news.com/news/ 
story.aspx?storyid=195506&catid=222; see also Jazmine Ulloa, Convict Couldn’t Handle Being 
Free, MYSA (Sept. 25, 2011), http://www.mysanantonio.com/news/local_news/article/ 
Convictcouldn-thandlebeing-free-2187648.php (“Most inmates want out of the pen.  Ran-
dall Lee Church burned a house down to get back inside.”); Andrew Marra, Man Charged 
in Robbery of West Palm Beach Bank of America Branch, PALM BEACH POST (Dec. 29, 2010), 
http://www.palmbeachpost.com/news/crime/man-charged-in-robbery-of-west-palm-
beach-1152346.html (explaining that “Charles Latham, 47, robbed the Bank of America in 
downtown West Palm Beach because he wanted to go back to prison”). 
 164.  In symbols, if p denotes the probability of conviction, h is the harm from crime, 
and ci(s) denotes the cost incurred by person i from being convicted for s years, then pci(s) 
<h can be true for all s and for some i.  Therefore, there will be individuals with benefit b 
such that, pci(s) <b<h, who commit, by definition, inefficient crimes. 
 165.  McAdams & Ulen, supra note 50, at 406. 
 166.  See, e.g., id. at 417–21 (discussing cognitive biases in further detail). 
 167.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, Cass R. Sunstein & Richard Thaler, A Behavioral Approach to 
Law and Economics, 50 STAN. L. REV. 1471, 1479 (1998) (discussing bounded willpower in 
further detail). 
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and thereby supply explanations for why people may commit ineffi-
cient crimes even when expected sanctions are very high. 
Specifically, it is well documented that many people have cogni-
tive biases leading them to be overconfident and optimistic.168  This 
insight, when applied to criminal law enforcement, suggests that crim-
inals will tend to overcommit crimes, that is, they will commit crimes in 
cases where the expected utility from committing crime exceeds their 
expected utility from refraining from committing crime.169  Finally, 
people may possess bounded willpower, which refers to the inability of a 
person to act in a manner that serves his long term benefits, even 
when he is perfectly informed about the costs and benefits associated 
with his actions.170  Criminals with bounded willpower will also tend to 
overcommit crimes, since the presence of immediate criminal benefits, 
rather than delayed expected penalties, will guide their decisions to 
commit crimes.171 
The existence of cognitive biases suggest that people may commit 
inefficient crimes, even when there are very high expected penalties, 
and that some criminals do not view imprisonment as a particularly 
harsh punishment.  As such, crimes will occur at any given level of 
punishment, even when the social cost exceeds the criminal benefits 
of such crimes.  In the remainder of this Article, I will assume that—at 
all relevant punishment levels—the proportion of inefficient crimes is 
relatively high, such that there are expected benefits from deterring 
                                                        
 168.  See, e.g., Christine Jolls, On Law Enforcement with Boundedly Rational Actors, in THE 
LAW AND ECONOMICS OF IRRATIONAL BEHAVIOR 273 (Francesco Parisi and Vernon Smith 
eds., 2004) (“[A] highly robust feature of human behavior is that people underestimate 
the probability that negative events will happen to them as opposed to others”); see also 
Russell B. Korobkin & Thomas S. Ulen, Law and Behavioral Science: Removing the Rationality 
Assumption from Law and Economics, 88 CAL. L. REV. 1051, 1091–93 (2000) (discussing issues 
related to overconfidence and optimism biases); McAdams & Ulen, supra note 50; Neil D. 
Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Future Life Events, 39 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 
806 (1980); Neil D. Weinstein, Unrealistic Optimism About Susceptibility to Health Problems: 
Conclusions from a Community-Wide Sample, 10 J. BEHAV. MED. 481 (1987). 
 169.  A similar point is made by Korobkin and Ulen, supra note 168, at 1092. 
 170.  This point was made by Professor Robert Cooter long before the recent literature 
on behavioral L&E emerged.  See Cooter, supra note 12. 
 171.  This problem is commonly called dynamic inconsistency and is theorized by mak-
ing use of hyperbolic discounting.  See, e.g., Manuel A. Utset, Hyperbolic Criminals and Re-
peated Time-Inconsistent Misconduct, 44 HOUS. L. REV. 609, 612 (2007). 
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crimes and from incapacitating individuals with a likelihood of recidi-
vating.172 
Having introduced the reasons why people may possess fluctuat-
ing criminal tendencies and how their tendencies do not necessarily 
reflect their criminal benefits, I now consider individuals who almost 
never need to be deterred because they find it morally wrong to 
commit crimes.  Such individuals have low tendencies to commit 
crime, but, even if rarely, may “lapse”173 into committing crime. 
D.  Law Abiding Citizens, Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies, and Non-
Deterrable Crimes 
Consider Michael, a person who under normal circumstances 
cannot even imagine murdering someone.  Ordinarily he would not 
kill, even if it were legal.  But, if he ever finds his wife in bed with an-
other man, he would temporarily be overcome by the temptation of 
attacking that person (or his wife174) regardless of the penalty associ-
ated with murder (or manslaughter), and this attack may result in the 
death of that person.  If, however, Michael has sufficient cooling time,175 
he would realize that attacking either individual would be a mistake 
and decide not to commit a crime.  When Michael acts under the in-
fluence of temporary and emotional stimuli, he acts against his best 
interest. 
For purposes of sketching out Michael’s fluctuating criminal 
tendencies, which may diverge from his benefits, it is sufficient to 
note that Michael may temporarily be undeterrable in cases where he 
is under the influence of emotional stimuli.  Furthermore, even if very 
rarely, Michael gets so angry at people that, but for the prospect of 
imprisonment, he would consider killing them.  In this case, the PDF 
                                                        
 172.  This is a weaker assumption than the assumption that the harm from crime always 
exceeds the benefit from crime, which has previously been invoked in economic analyses 
of law enforcement.  See, e.g., Louis Kaplow, The Optimal Probability and Magnitude of Fines for 
Acts that Definitely are Undesirable, 12 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 3 (1992). 
 173.  The term lapsing is used by Cooter, supra note 12, to refer to situations where indi-
viduals commit crime.  Professor Cooter defines lapses as the “rare occasions when [the 
potential offender] draws preferences from the tail of the distribution where uncertain or 
future costs are discounted very highly.” Id. at 150. 
 174.  See supra note 158. 
 175.  See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 305 (discussing the concept of cooling time 
and a number of cases interpreting it). 
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representing Michael’s tendency to commit crime can be represented 
by Figure 4 below.176 
 
As Figure 4 demonstrates, there is little deterrence value to pun-
ishing Michael, because (1) most of the time (as in Zone 1) punish-
ment is unnecessary; Michael abstains from crime even if there is no 
punishment, (2) in the unlikely event that Michael has a desire to 
commit crime, it is more likely than not that there is no punishment 
available that can deter him (as in Zone 3).  Furthermore, in the rare 
case when Michael has a desire to commit crime and can be deterred 
from doing so (as in Zone 2), relatively small expected punishments 
are usually sufficient for deterrence purposes.  Thus, from a deter-
rence perspective, if each individual in society were like Michael, it 
                                                        
 176.  For expositional purposes, Figure 4 is drawn such that it assigns positive densities 
for values smaller than “0 years” as well as for values greater than “100 years.”  The choice 
of ‘100’ years is completely arbitrary.  One may object to this exposition, suggesting that 
such values cannot exist or are meaningless.  The purpose here is to represent by Zone 1 
the frequency with which Michael has no desire to commit crime and by Zone 3 the fre-
quency with which Michael is nondeterrable.  This exposition enables such representation 
in a comprehensible and compact manner.  An alternative way of representing the same 
idea would be to assign positive probabilities to points “0 years” and “100 years.”  But this 
would require the use of mixed distributions, which would be more difficult to represent and 
explain.  See DeGroot et al., supra note 147, at 108 (explaining mixed distributions).  Fur-
thermore, with some creativity, values smaller than “0 years” could be interpreted as cases 
corresponding to subsidized crimes (for example, the government rewards rather than 
punishing crime) and values greater than “100 years” can be interpreted as being tortured 
at varying degrees of severity while in jail. 
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would be desirable to either not punish the killing of other people, or 
to impose relatively small punishments. 
Scholars have criticized L&E theories of punishment by making 
similar points;177 if most crimes are committed by people who are un-
deterrable, how can we explain the fact that we punish them by using 
an L&E theory?  I answer this and related questions in the next Part. 
V.  ECONOMIC ANALYSIS WITH FLUCTUATING CRIMINAL TENDENCIES 
There are at least two interrelated potential reasons why, from a 
consequentialist perspective, criminals ought to be punished, even if 
most criminals are frequently nondeterrable.  First, imprisoning non-
deterrable criminals incapacitates them and prevents them from 
committing further crime.178  Accordingly, if the harm179 associated 
with the crime prevented through incapacitation exceeds the cost of 
imprisonment, punishing nondeterrable criminals through impris-
onment is justifiable on consequentialist grounds.180  Second, even if 
some potential criminals are frequently nondeterrable, punishment 
could still, even if infrequently, lead them to abstain from committing 
crime181 and deter other potential criminals who are more responsive 
to punishment.  Therefore, if benefits associated with the deterrence 
of such a minority exceeds the cost of punishing nondeterrable crim-
inals, then punishment would again be justifiable on consequentialist 
grounds. 
The first consequentialist (and incapacitation-based) justification 
for punishment exists only if the criminal being punished has a signif-
icant likelihood of committing crime in the future.182  If every individ-
ual were like Michael,183 we would not expect to see a high frequency 
of recidivism; therefore, benefits from incapacitation would be offset 
                                                        
 177.  See supra note 3. 
 178.  See supra note 13 and accompanying text. But see Ehrlich, supra note 19, at 315 
(mentioning a caveat “although imprisonment temporarily eliminates participation in 
criminal activity outside of prison walls, it does not stop it inside”). 
 179.  If criminal benefits are included in the social welfare calculus, then social harm 
equals the harm to the victim minus the benefit to the criminal.  See supra Part II. 
 180.  See infra Part V.A. 
 181.  For example, Michael, whose criminal tendencies are depicted in Figure 4, is de-
terred from committing crime when his criminal tendencies fall in Zone 2 in Figure 4. 
 182.  See Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation, supra note 17 (demonstrating that incapacitative 
benefits increase with the offender’s dangerousness, that is, his likelihood of recidivating). 
 183.  See supra Figure 4 (summarizing Michael’s criminal tendencies). 
  
206 MARYLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 72:156 
by costs of imprisonment.184  Similarly, we would not expect benefits 
associated with deterrence to be high, because punishment rarely de-
ters people like Michael.185  Both justifications rely on there being at 
least some individuals who do not have criminal tendencies similar to 
Michael’s. 
Having established that the presence of individuals, who are dif-
ferent than Michael, is a necessary condition for the proffered conse-
quentialist justifications for punishment in general, we must ask 
whether they are also sufficient for providing rationales for the “puz-
zling” practices in criminal law discussed in Part III.  In the remainder 
of this Part, I demonstrate that if there are some individuals who have 
high criminal tendencies186 and are more responsive to punishment—
along with people like Michael—then many “puzzling” doctrines and 
legal practices can be justified on consequentialist grounds.  I also 
demonstrate the key role that fluctuating criminal tendencies play in 
these justifications. 
Briefly stated, when there are professional criminals (individuals 
with fluctuating and high criminal tendencies), as well as non-
professional criminals (individuals like Michael), existing practices in 
criminal law can be interpreted as mechanisms that address the trade-
off between minimizing the unnecessary costs of punishing non-
professional criminals and maximizing the deterrence and incapacita-
tion of professional criminals. 
A.  Punishing Repeat Offenders More Severely 
When people possess constant criminal tendencies, it is hard to 
provide a consequentialist and satisfying justification as to why repeat 
offenders should be punished more severely.  When we assume that 
people have fluctuating criminal tendencies, then punishing repeat 
                                                        
 184.  See Shavell, Optimal Incapacitation, supra note 17 (explaining that higher levels of 
punishment, like incapacitation, are ineffective in situations where there are only rare in-
stances of potentially criminal behavior). 
 185.  This follows from the fact that Zone 2, in Figure 4, occupies a very small area in 
comparison to Zones 1 and 3. 
 186.  The existence of individuals with high criminal tendencies is supported by arrest 
data offered by the Bureau of Justice Statistics.  In particular, the data suggest that over two 
thirds of prisoners released in 1994 were rearrested within three years after their release.  
Patrick A. Langan & David J. Levin, Recidivism of Prisoners Released in 1994, 15 FED. 
SENTENCING REP. 58, 58 (2002). 
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offenders more severely serves a consequentialist purpose related to 
its information-exploiting feature.187 
When a person is caught committing crime for the first time, it is 
not clear whether he did it because he is a professional criminal, or 
because he is a nonprofessional criminal who happened to have an 
unexpected impulse which led him to lose control over his actions.188  
If the first time offender committed a crime due to the latter explana-
tion, then it makes little sense to punish him severely.  As explained 
earlier, nonprofessional criminals are unlikely to recidivate, and se-
vere sanctions are rarely necessary or incapable of deterring them.189  
In this case, incapacitation and deterrence rationales for punishment 
do not exist, or are very weak.  If, on the other hand, the first-time of-
fender is a professional criminal, then he should be punished severely 
because punishment results in significant incapacitation as well as de-
terrence benefits. 
For purposes of sentencing, however, it is not possible to distin-
guish between first-time offenders who are professional and nonpro-
fessional criminals, because criminal tendencies are not directly ob-
servable.190  Accordingly, both types must be punished uniformly.  
This creates a simple trade-off: reducing costs of punishing nonpro-
fessional criminals and increasing the deterrence and incapacitation 
of professional criminals.191  The greater the proportion of nonprofes-
                                                        
 187.  An interesting question to consider is to what extent the rationales provided in 
this Section extend to corporate crimes and liabilities. Since individuals who have control 
over corporations change over time, updating Bayesian beliefs, as described in note 193, 
concerning the dangerousness of corporations may often be difficult or meaningless.  In 
cases where such updating is impossible the rationale for punishing offenders discussed in 
this Section vanishes for corporations, but not individuals.  For a discussion of optimal 
punishment of corporations versus individuals, see Douglas H. Ginsburg & Joshua D. 
Wright, Antitrust Sanctions, in 6 COMPETITION POL’Y INT’L 3 (2010); Jennifer Arlen, Corpo-
rate Criminal Liability: Theory and Evidence, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF 
CRIMINAL LAW (Alon Harel & Keith Hylton, eds., forthcoming 2012). 
 188.  This would correspond to the case where a person has criminal tendencies similar 
to those depicted in Figure 4, and due to some rare event temporarily falls in Zone 3 and 
is undeterrable. 
 189.  They are unlikely to recidivate, because ex ante, their likelihood of falling in 
Zones 2 and 3, as in Figure 4, is very small.  They are rarely deterred by severe sanctions 
because Zone 2, in Figure 4, occupies a very small area in comparison to Zones 1 and 3. 
 190.  See supra Part IV.D. 
 191.  See supra Part II.D. 
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sional offenders in society, the more important it becomes to reduce 
the costs of punishing these offenders, and vice versa.192  This observa-
tion is key to explaining why, from a consequentialist perspective, re-
peat offenders ought to be punished more severely. 
Just as it is impossible to determine with certainty whether a first-
time offender is a nonprofessional or a professional criminal, it is im-
possible to determine the same for a repeat offender.  The fact that a 
person is a repeat offender, however, does provide some valuable in-
formation for sentencing purposes: a repeat offender is much less 
likely to be a nonprofessional criminal than a professional criminal.  
This follows from a simple application of Bayesian updating of be-
liefs.193  Given that a person has committed crime twice, it is likely that 
this person is professional criminal and has a PDF that assigns high 
benefits from crime.  As a result, the proportion of repeat offenders 
who are nonprofessional criminals should be much lower than the 
proportion of first-time offenders who are nonprofessional criminals. 
As explained earlier, there is a trade-off between minimizing the 
costs of punishing nonprofessional criminals and deterring and inca-
pacitating professional criminals.  This trade-off necessitates the im-
                                                        
 192.  This observation may be capable of providing a novel explanation as to why penal-
ties for similar offenses are higher in the United States than in other countries.  More 
generally, if the proportion of nonprofessional criminals is decreasing with inequality, 
then we should see higher sentences for similar offenses in countries with higher inequali-
ty.  As such, this brief observation may provide a starting point for future research projects. 
 193.  Bayesian updating of beliefs occurs when the discovery of a piece of information 
affects the estimated likelihood of an event taking place.  The concept is closely related to 
the calculation of conditional probabilities and Bayes’s Theorem.  See, e.g., DeGroot et al., 
supra note 147, at 49–79.  The likelihood that one believes a certain event will occur, prior 
to the discovery of new information, is called the prior probability of that event happening. 
Similarly, the likelihood that one believes a certain event will occur, after the discovery of 
new information, is called the posterior probability of that event happening.  The posterior 
probability that a repeat offender, named Y, is a professional criminal (PC), can be calcu-
lated by using Bayes’s Theorem. 
Pr(Y is PC|Y committed 2nd crime) = 
Pr(Y is PC)Pr(Y committed 2nd crime|Y is PC) 
Pr(Y is PC)Pr(Y committed 2nd crime|Y is PC) + Pr(Y is not PC)Pr(Y committed 
2nd crime|Y is not PC) 
Id. at 69.  This expression, which makes use of the notation introduced in note 147, is 
greater than the prior probability of Y being a professional offender as long as professional 
criminals have greater tendencies to commit crime. 
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position of severe punishments to a group of criminals when it is 
known that the proportion of professional criminals in that group is 
high.  From the preceding discussion, it follows that the proportion of 
professional criminals is much higher among repeat offenders.  This 
implies that repeat offenders should be punished more severely than 
first-time offenders. 
It should be noted that this reasoning provides a rationale for the 
common practice of tying criminal penalties to criminals’ prior rec-
ords.194  The Federal Sentencing Guidelines structure punishment 
schemes by increasing sentences for those with prior criminal activi-
ty.195  Many states have “three strikes” laws, which require enhanced 
punishments for criminals with a record of three or more serious of-
fenses.196  These practices are justified from a consequentialist per-
spective.  Prior criminal records indicate a greater likelihood that the 
criminal has high criminal tendencies and has not committed a crime 
due to some unexpected random event.197  This implies that the crim-
inal is both more dangerous and often deterrable, and therefore 
should be punished severely. 
Finally, it is worth mentioning that this justification cannot be 
derived under theories that rely on or assume constant criminal bene-
fits.  In such theories, a person’s criminal tendency is immediately re-
vealed after he commits a crime.  As such, it is neither possible nor 
necessary to obtain further information regarding the offender’s 
criminal tendencies.  Therefore, the trade-off identified in the pre-
ceding parts of this Section, and accordingly the rationale justifying 
more severe punishments for repeat offenders, disappears. 
B.  Remorse and Apologies 
In Part IV, I explained how potential offenders’ criminal tenden-
cies may fluctuate, and how a PDF may be used to describe the likeli-
hood with which a potential offender commits crime.  Although this 
framework accounts for fluctuations in criminal tendencies over time, 
it still generates a static framework.  In other words, it assumes that a 
potential offender has the same PDF over time.  To study remorse, 
this assumption can be replaced with a more realistic one under a dy-
                                                        
 194.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
 195.  See supra note 21. 
 196.  See supra note 108. 
 197.  See supra Part III.B.1. 
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namic setting.  In particular, an offender’s PDF may piecewise shift 
upon committing crime.198 
Shifts in PDFs are convenient and realistic ways to capture re-
morse.  A person who feels truly sorry after committing a crime, pre-
sumably, and at least partially, loses his willingness to commit crime 
and is likely to exert more control over his actions in the future.199  
Thus, he is less likely to commit crime in the future.  As such, the 
change in a remorseful offenders’ criminal attitude can be captured 
by a shift in his PDF, as demonstrated in Figure 5 below. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
 198.  See, e.g., Murat C. Mungan, A Note on the Effects of State-Dependent Benefits on Optimal 
Law Enforcement, 6 REV. L. & ECON. 97 (2010) [hereinafter Mungan, State-Dependent Benefits] 
(showing that if criminals’ benefits are dependent on the state then maximal fines need 
not be optimal); Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24 (providing formal models where re-
morseful offenders derive disutility, in the form of guilty conscience).  These models, un-
like the model presented here, do not incorporate repeated interactions, and therefore 
cannot capture the effects of such disutilities on future propensities to commit crime. 
 199.  See Mungan, State-Dependent Benefits, supra note 198, at 98 (briefly reviewing the ex-
isting literature and concluding that “[i]n sum it has been documented that some individ-
uals, if not all, feel a sense of guilt after committing a crime”); see also, e.g., JACOB ADLER, 
THE URGINGS OF CONSCIENCE: A THEORY OF PUNISHMENT (1992); Michael S. Bernick, Of 
Crime and Conscience, 68 A.B.A. J. 306 (1982); Stephanos Bibas, Forgiveness in Criminal Proce-
dure, 4 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 329 (2007); Darren Bush, Law and Economics of Restorative Jus-
tice: Why Restorative Justice Cannot and Should Not Be Solely About Restoration 2003 UTAH L. 
REV. 439; Robert F. Cochran, Jr., Crime, Confession, and the Counselor-At-Law: Lessons from 
Dostoyevsky, 35 HOUS. L. REV. 327 (1998); John Tasioulas, Repentance and the Liberal State, 4 
OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 487 (2007); Bruce J. Winick, The Jurisprudence of Therapeutic Jurispru-
dence, 3 PSYCHOL., PUB. POL’Y & L. 184 (1997). 
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Figure 5 demonstrates that a truly remorseful offender is less 
likely to recidivate than a nonremorseful offender whose fluctuating 
criminal tendencies remain unchanged and therefore is represented 
by Curve I.  Accordingly, the incapacitative benefits of punishing re-
morseful offenders are not as high as the corresponding benefits aris-
ing through the punishment of non-remorseful offenders.200  This im-
plies that if it were possible to separate truly remorseful offenders 
from those who are not, it would be optimal to punish remorseful of-
fenders less severely.201 
Remorse does not only signal that an offender’s criminal tenden-
cies have been altered after committing a crime.  It is plausible to as-
sume that a person who has committed a crime due to some unex-
pected impulse is more likely to experience remorse than a 
professional offender.202  As such, the proportion of professional of-
fenders among nonremorseful offenders is higher than the propor-
tion of professional offenders among remorseful offenders.  There-
fore, as explained in Part V.A, the expected incapacitative and 
deterrent benefits of punishing remorseful offenders are lower than 
the corresponding expected benefits of punishing nonremorseful of-
fenders.  This implies that, if it were possible to separate truly re-
                                                        
 200.  This follows from the fact that, in Figure 5, the area of the first zone lying under 
Curve I is smaller than the corresponding area lying under Curve R. 
 201.  This follows from the simple fact that punishment of remorseful offenders results 
in smaller deterrent as well as incapacitative benefits, as implied by Figure 5. 
 202.  I thank Mark Seidenfeld for making this point. 
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morseful offenders from those who are not, it would be optimal to 
punish remorseful offenders less severely. 
It is impossible, however, to separate truly remorseful offenders 
from those who are not.203  This impossibility, as I have demonstrated 
in a previous article,204 may lead to substantial costs associated with 
penalty reductions for those who convincingly display remorse.205  In-
corporating the observation that remorseful offenders are less likely 
to recidivate, and therefore that they ideally ought to be punished less 
severely, generates a counter rationale as to why it may be desirable to 
allow penalty reductions for seemingly sincere apologies.206  As such, 
incorporating dynamic and fluctuating criminal tendencies in eco-
nomic analyses leads to a broader range of conditions under which 
sentence reductions for those who convincingly display remorse is jus-
tified. 
A second important implication of incorporating remorse 
through dynamic fluctuating benefits is revealed when one makes the 
observation that a repeat offender was most likely not remorseful after 
his first offense, since it is unlikely for a remorseful offender to recidi-
vate.207  Therefore, a repeat offender is not likely to have experienced 
remorse after his initial crime, and it is unlikely that a repeat offender 
has a shifted PDF.208 
This observation provides an additional rationale as to why re-
peat offenders ought to be punished severely.  The proportion of first-
time offenders who feel remorseful upon committing crime is ex-
pected to be much higher than the corresponding proportion of re-
peat offenders.  Therefore, expected incapacitative benefits associated 
with punishing repeat offenders is much higher than the incapacita-
tive benefits of punishing first-time offenders.  Hence, it is worth in-
curring greater punishment costs to imprison repeat offenders for 
longer periods of time. 
                                                        
 203.  See supra note 127 and accompanying text. 
 204.  See Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24. 
 205.  See supra note 128 and accompanying text. 
 206.  Mungan, Apologies, supra note 24. 
 207.  See id. at 180 n.14 (“The unit cost of punishing a truly remorseful offender may be 
smaller than punishing a non-remorseful offender, because the former may be less likely 
to recidivate.”). 
 208.  Recall that the shifted PDF is the one represented by Curve I in Figure 5. 
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C.  Voluntary Manslaughter 
Existing L&E literature is not very successful in providing conse-
quentialist justifications as to why heat of passion crimes should be 
punished less severely.209  When one considers fluctuating criminal 
benefits and the incapacitation function of punishment, consequen-
tialist theories providing rationales for penalty reductions for volun-
tary manslaughter can be strengthened significantly. 
Recall Michael’s fluctuating criminal tendencies from Part IV: 
Voluntary manslaughter presumably occurs when Michael has crimi-
nal tendencies falling under Zone III in Figure 4.  For instance, if Mi-
chael finds his wife with another man, he may temporarily be unaware 
of the expected punishment associated with attacking his wife210 or the 
person with whom she is having an affair; therefore, he is undeterra-
ble. 
Since Michael is undeterrable under these circumstances, it 
makes little sense, from a deterrence based L&E perspective, to pun-
ish him for his crime.211  In fact, if we were certain that every person 
killing his adulterous spouse was undeterrable at the time he commit-
ted the crime—again from a simple deterrence-based perspective—it 
would be optimal to not punish any person for such crimes.212 
It is certainly much more realistic to assume that at least a pro-
portion of people respond to incentives, even when confronted with 
the unfortunate circumstance just described.213  In fact, it may be nec-
essary to increase, rather than reduce, the sanction for voluntary man-
slaughter to deter people who respond to incentives but place a very 
high value on inflicting pain on adulterous people.214 
This being the case, it is a priori and theoretically ambiguous 
from a deterrence-based perspective, whether penalty reductions for 
                                                        
 209.  But see Part III.B.3, where I summarize a powerful argument presented by Posner.  
Note that this argument, too, relies on a variant of fluctuating criminal tendencies. 
 210.  See supra note 158. 
 211.  One may argue that punishing him may result in benefits to the victim’s family, 
relatives, and friends.  Although this argument is somewhat convincing, it is certainly in-
complete.  Not punishing the offender results in similar benefits to the offender’s family, 
relatives, and friends. 
 212.  See supra Parts II.C–D. 
 213.  See Kahan & Nussbaum, supra note 9, at 310 (“[T]he common law paradigms of 
‘adequate provocation’—adultery and humiliating but non-life-threatening blows to the 
face—occur frequently without leading to deadly retaliation.”). 
 214.  See supra notes 137–138 and accompanying text. 
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voluntary manslaughter are justified, even when one accounts for 
fluctuating criminal tendencies.  The question ultimately becomes an 
empirical one: Are the imprisonment cost savings from penalty reduc-
tions for voluntary manslaughter offset by the same reductions’ deter-
rence-lowering effect?215  To the extent that we believe the answer to 
this question is “no,” we have a consequentialist justification for pen-
alty reductions for voluntary manslaughter in a purely deterrence-
based framework. 
Assuming, however, that we answer this question in the affirma-
tive, a second consideration must be taken into account, namely the 
incapacitation function of imprisonment.  The limited L&E research 
on incapacitation suggests that the benefit of incapacitation increases 
with the imprisoned offender’s dangerousness.216  Therefore, if the 
expected dangerousness of a murderer is higher than the expected 
dangerousness of a person who has committed voluntary manslaugh-
ter, a second rationale emerges as to why voluntary manslaughter 
ought to be punished less severely. 
It is reasonable to assume that individuals like Michael are more 
likely to commit voluntary manslaughter than murder.217  As such, the 
proportion of individuals who are likely to recidivate among murder-
ers is higher than the corresponding proportion of individuals who 
have committed voluntary manslaughter.218  Therefore, the expected 
dangerousness of a murderer is higher than the expected dangerous-
ness of a person who has committed voluntary manslaughter. 
This observation supplies a second, consequentialist reason as to 
why penalty reductions for voluntary manslaughter make sense.  Final-
ly, for the sake of completeness, I will briefly propose a third, inde-
                                                        
 215.  See supra Part II.C–D. 
 216.  See supra notes 64–65 and accompanying text. 
 217.  This follows from the assumption that circumstances pushing Michael’s criminal 
tendencies to Zones 2 and 3 in Figure 4 are more likely to be products of extreme emo-
tional stimuli.  Therefore, a killing committed by Michael is more likely to constitute vol-
untary manslaughter than murder. 
 218.  This reasoning implicitly makes a number of harmless suppositions.  The most 
important one is that the number of “dangerous” people being convicted for murder is at 
least as great as the number of people being convicted for voluntary manslaughter.  The 
second one is that people like Michael are unlikely to recidivate, which follows from the 
fact that Zones 2 and 3 in Figure 4 occupy small areas.  Furthermore, to the extent that 
people like Michael are likely to experience remorse, their probability of becoming recidi-
vists falls even further. 
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pendent rationale as to why voluntary manslaughter ought to be pun-
ished less severely, although this rationale is unrelated to the two sim-
ple observations that constitute the focus of this Article.219 
In general, precautions taken by victims to avoid harm are social-
ly wasteful.220  In the case of voluntary manslaughter, to the contrary, 
they can be socially beneficial.  In the context of voluntary man-
slaughter, the precautionary activity on the victims’ side would corre-
spond to not provoking the potential offender.  To the extent that 
such provocation is socially costly,221 its prevention is socially benefi-
cial.222  Therefore, ceteris paribus, the existence of such social benefits 
                                                        
 219.  These observations are: (1) that people exert varying degrees of control over their 
actions over time, and (2) that imprisonment has an incapacitation effect. 
 220.  A common example is the installation of an alarm system to protect one’s house 
from theft.  For related literature on costly precautionary activity by potential victims, see 
Steven Shavell, Individual Precautions to Prevent Theft: Private Versus Socially Optimal Behavior, 
11 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 123 (1991).  Specifically, he says: 
Individuals act in a variety of ways to protect their property against theft: they 
lock their doors, purchase alarm systems, hire guards, and so forth. The things 
that individuals do on their own to reduce theft are of substantial importance.  It 
is notable that private expenditures on security from crime exceed public ex-
penditures. 
Id. at 123 (citing William C. Cunningham & Todd H. Taylor, The Growing Role of Private Se-
curity, NAT’L INSTS. JUSTICE, RESEARCH IN BRIEF (1984), for the proposition that “private 
expenditures on security from crime exceed public expenditures”)); Gordon Tullock, The 
Welfare Costs of Tariffs, Monopolies, and Theft, 5 W. ECON. J. 224, 231 (1967) (“The total social 
cost of theft is the sum of the efforts invested in the activity of theft, private protection 
against theft, and the public investment in police protection.”); Keith N. Hylton, Optimal 
Law Enforcement and Victim Precaution, 27 RAND J. ECON. 197 (1996) (extending the analysis 
of costly precautionary activity by potential victims).  Other secondary or indirect effects of 
criminal law rules and standards on parties other than potential criminals are explored in 
the existing literature to some extent.  See, e.g., Alon Harel, Efficiency and Fairness in Crimi-
nal Law: The Case for a Criminal Law Principle of Comparative Fault, 82 CAL. L. REV. 1181 
(1994) [hereinafter Harel, Comparative Fault]. 
 221.  Provocation may, for instance, involve insulting the potential offender, causing 
him distress. 
 222.  See Harel, Comparative Fault, supra note 220, at 1215–16 (raising a similar point).  
This observation presents an alternative explanation to Kahan and Nussbaum’s proffered 
explanation as to why the common law categorizes provocation the way it does.  See Kahan 
& Nussbaum, supra note 10, at 312 (“From the common law provocation categories, for 
example, it can be inferred that the law does not attach as much value to the life of the 
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provides a third consequentialist rationale for punishing voluntary 
manslaughter less severely. 
D.  The Role of Fluctuating Criminal Tendencies and Incapacitation 
The rationales provided for these three selected criminal law 
practices share a commonality: they exploit information revealed 
through various aspects of the crime or characteristics of the criminal.  
By using such information, one can use a Bayesian belief updating 
process223 to re-evaluate the likelihood that the criminal is dangerous.  
Since incapacitative benefits are greater for more dangerous offend-
ers, the more dangerous the criminal, the longer he ought to be im-
prisoned. 
Fluctuating criminal tendencies play a key role in this reasoning.  
It is only because criminal tendencies are fluctuating that one cannot 
conclude from the mere fact that an offender committed a crime that 
he is sufficiently dangerous.224  Because of the uncertainty created by 
the existence of fluctuating criminal tendencies, one should hesitate 
to impose harsh punishments on individuals and question whether 
the offender will repeat his wrongs in the future. 
VI.  SUMMARY & CONCLUSION 
Economic analyses of criminal law are criticized for invoking un-
realistic assumptions and performing poorly in providing rationales 
for a number of criminal law doctrines.225  These criticisms may lead 
legal scholars to be skeptical about the usefulness of conclusions 
drawn from economic analyses of criminal law.226  In this Article, I 
demonstrate that the poor performance of economic analyses in 
providing rationales for various criminal law doctrines is not the result 
of some inherent flaw in its methodology, but instead a result of its 
oversimplified assumptions. 
Existing normative economic analyses apply consequentialism 
narrowly by focusing on deterrence as the single justification for pun-
ishment, and by implicitly or explicitly assuming that potential of-
                                                        
paramour as it does to the life of the average person, and for that reason it invests less in 
punishing emotions that promote killings of the former.”). 
 223.  See supra note 193. 
 224.  See supra Part V.A. 
 225.  See supra Parts I, III.B. 
 226.  See supra Parts I, II.B. 
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fenders’ tendency to commit crime remains constant over time.227  By 
relaxing these two assumptions, and replacing them with simple, yet 
more realistic alternatives, economic analyses can perform much bet-
ter in providing rationales for existing criminal law practices.228  In 
particular, economic analyses perform much better when they replace 
the assumption of constant criminal tendencies with fluctuating crim-
inal tendencies, and incorporate the fact that the incapacitation func-
tion of imprisonment contributes to reductions in crime.229  As point-
ed out in this Article, these replacements can be made by employing 
existing tools in modern economics.230  An economic model that 
makes these simple adjustments can provide strong rationales for per-
vasive criminal law practices.231 
These rationales focus on a Bayesian belief updating process.232  
When fluctuating criminal tendencies are considered, the mere fact 
that a person has committed a crime reveals imperfect information 
about his dangerousness.233  Therefore, circumstances surrounding 
the crime reveal important pieces of information that can be used to 
update beliefs concerning an offender’s dangerousness.234  Since in-
capacitative benefits are greater for more dangerous offenders, the 
stronger we believe—based on circumstances surrounding the 
crime—that the criminal is dangerous, the longer we are willing to 
imprison him.235 
By relying on these rationales, this Article demonstrates that the 
poor performance of economic analyses in providing explanations for 
a number of criminal law practices is something that can be remedied 
by focusing on a broader application of consequentialist theories of 
punishment.236  Although this Article focuses on three selected issues 
in criminal law—repeat offender laws, voluntary manslaughter laws, 
and punishment of remorseful offenders—the model proposed ap-
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pears capable of explaining the social desirability of other pervasive 
principles and doctrines in criminal law. 
Consider, for instance, the mens rea requirement in criminal law.  
This Article provides a framework to conceptualize this requirement 
as an information-exploiting device.237  A criminal’s mental state while 
committing a harmful act reveals information about his likelihood of 
recidivating.  Applying the insights identified in this Article suggests 
that criminals should be punished in proportion to the intentionality 
of their acts.  I have not, however, provided a complete model to inte-
grate the mens rea requirement into economic analyses of criminal 
law.  This is an interesting and promising area for future research. 
                                                        
 237.  See supra Part V. 
